Family networks and school enrolment: Evidence from a randomized social experiment

We present evidence on whether and how a household's behavior is influenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended family. Using data from the PROGRESA program in Mexico, we exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in conjunction with the Spanish naming convention to identify the inter- and intra-generational family links of each household to others in the same village. We then exploit the randomized research design of the PROGRESA evaluation data to identify whether the treatment effects of PROGRESA transfers on secondary school enrolment vary according to the characteristics of extended family. We find PROGRESA only raises secondary enrolment among households that are embedded in a family network. Eligible but isolated households do not respond. The mechanism through which the extended family influences household schooling choices is the redistribution of resources within the family network from eligibles that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers from PROGRESA, towards eligibles on the margin of enrolling children into secondary school.     

The Multi-Actor Multi-Criteria Analysis (MAMCA) application in the Flemish long-term decision making process on mobility and logistics

The Multi-Actor Multi-Criteria Analysis (MAMCA) is a methodology to evaluate different policy measures whereby different stakeholders’ opinions are explicitly taken into account. This paper describes the MAMCA methodology and how it has been used in the “Flanders in Action Process”. One of the objectives of this process is to turn Flanders into a top region in terms of mobility and logistics by attracting logistic activities with a large added value, realizing fluent and widely accessible mobility, a huge increase in traffic safety and a decrease of the environmental impact of transport. As there are a wide range of actors with different interests involved in this process, the MAMCA methodology was applied to evaluate a set of possible policy measures being proposed to reach this objective. An important advantage of this methodology is that it is able to support the decision maker in his final decision as the inclusion of different points of view leads to a general prioritisation of the proposed policy measures.     

The Discovery of the Third World

Corporatism in the academy continues to invite controversy just as it did nearly a century ago. Thorstein Veblen articulated many of the early concerns in Higher Learning in America ([1918] 1965). Many current commentaries on the subject echo Veblen's sentiments but appear to be oblivious of his tremendous intellectual legacy. This sad state of affairs may be a product of the severe reaction of early critics to Higher Learning followed by years of scholarly indifference. Nevertheless, the modern critiques of corporatism in the academy attest to the remarkable prescience of Veblen and his unique evolutionary perspective. Furthermore, critical opinion to the contrary, Higher Learning lacks neither logical consistency nor methodological integrity. Instead, Veblen's thoughts on the limits of pragmatic utilitarianism offer valuable insight into the ongoing controversy surrounding corporatism and higher learning.     

Flexibility at the Margin and Labor Market Volatility in OECD Countries*

We study the business‐cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting fixed‐term contracts). We present a matching model with temporary and permanent jobs (i) where there is a gap in the firing costs associated with these types of jobs and (ii) where there are restrictions in the creation and duration of fixed‐term contracts. We show that a labor market with ``flexibility at the margin'' increases the unemployment volatility with respect to one that is fully regulated. This analysis yields new insights into the interpretation of the recent volatility changes witnessed in the OECD area.     

AMBITIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSESSING MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

This paper addresses the issue of measuring armed forces’ performance in crisis response operations. By means of interviews (17 respondents) and a large scale survey (1,253 respondents) field and general officers of the Netherlands Armed Forces (NAF) have been questioned on perceived organisational success in crisis response operations. The Dutch officers assess the NAF's performance positively. A number of senior officers are hesitant about the usefulness of measuring the performance of crisis response operations. According to them the context in which the operations are being executed is too complex. Most interviewees, however, are convinced that measuring performance is useful and should be improved. These military leaders express a strong need for criteria to assess their performance on the job.     

A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems

We examine the role of school grades as a signal of worker productivity under different examination systems in relation to errors that may affect student performance. Firms use school grades as a signal of workers’ effective skills, taking into account that these evaluations are effected by stochastic shocks. We show that more precise evaluation systems, being associated with a higher reactivity of wages to school grades, induce students to provide more effort. Low ability students tend to react less than high ability students. Moreover, individuals with low abilities may prefer less accurate evaluation systems. Nevertheless, when productivity increases, these systems become less convenient and the number of individuals preferring them diminishes. Our analysis highlights an important trade-off between centralised and decentralised evaluation systems. On the one hand, frequent evaluations, typical of decentralised systems, weaken the impact on grades of those errors which influence student performance and, so, reduce signal noise, while, on the other hand, different teachers generally adopt different performance assessment standards, leading to noisier evaluations.     

Competition Policy as Strategic Trade with Differentiated Products

The paper analyzes how countries use competition policy as a tool for strategic trade. In the model, two countries export to a third country. Each exporting country is endowed with a set of differentiated products. Each government chooses the number of exporters for its country and the products that each exporter sells in the first period, and a tax policy in the second period. Firms choose prices or quantities independently in the third period. In the unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium, both countries group all their products within a single firm—the “national champion policy.” We study the implication of different assumptions about the timing of the game.