Markups and bargaining power in tradable and non-tradable sectors

This article jointly estimates product and labour market imperfections for narrowly defined sectors in the Portuguese economy for the period 2006–2009, following Roeger (J Polit Econ 103(2):316–330, 1995), Crépon et al. (Ann Econ Stat (79/80):583–610, 2005), Dobbelaere (Int J Ind Organ 22(10):1381–1398, 2004) and Abraham et al. (Rev World Econ 145(1):13–36, 2009). In addition, we propose a criterion for the identification of tradable and non-tradable sectors based on the export-to-sales ratio and compare markups and workers’ bargaining power along this dimension. Our findings suggest that markups are higher in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector but workers’ bargaining power is similar. In addition, there is a significant level of heterogeneity across markets, particularly in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, the article confirms that, if labour market imperfections are disregarded, markups are significantly understated.     

A general equilibrium framework for the affine class of term structure models

The Duffie and Kan (1966) model, which can be considered as the most general affine term structure formulation, was originally specified in terms of risk-adjusted stochastic processes for its state variables. The goal of the present paper is to derive a Duffie and Kan (1966) model specification under the physical probability measure that is compatible with the formulation given by the authors under the equivalent martingale (money market account) measure. For that purpose, the Duffie and Kan (1966) model will be fitted into a general equilibrium monetary framework. The resulting analytical solution for the vector of factor risk premiums enables the econometric estimation of the model parameters using a time-series or a panel-data approach, and nests, as special cases, several other specifications already proposed in the literature.Received: November 2002, Accepted: February 2004, JEL Classification: E43, G11, G12Financial support by FCTs research grant PRAXISXXI/BD/5712/95 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Aggregation of Utility and Equivalence Scales: A Solution to the Pangloss Critique

Definitions of equivalence scales are usually based on a household utility function. This may be founded on an assumption of the household maximizing a welfare function of individual utilities. Basing inter-household comparisons of welfare on this approach is fallacious because households put different weight on the utility of the various household members, a weighting that does not necessarily correspond to an ethically sound aggregation of utility. This is called the Pangloss critique. To solve the problem, I suggest keeping the model of household behavior, but to introduce a new function to aggregate the household members' utilities. Equivalence scales based on this approach are shown to have desirable properties.     

Manpower targets and educational investments

Quadratic programming can be useful to compute the optimal investment trajectory for an education system which is planned on the base of manpower targets. The computation of optimal investments required to approach manpower targets more closely becomes non trivial if the budget available is insufficient to meet manpower targets exactly, or if the manpower target trajectory is erratic.The quadratic programming problem consists of three components: (1) an optimization criterion which reflects the objective to minimize the squared deviation of actual manpower available from the manpower target; (2) a set of time difference equations which reflect the flow of students, the manpower stock flow and the flow of investments in the education subsystem; (3) a constraint on the budget, available for this branch of education over a planning period.This education investment problem is worked out for middle level technical manpower training in Bangladesh.     

Blended value and female entrepreneurial performance: social and economic aspects of education and technology transfer

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - We reviewed the literature on institutional forecasters of entrepreneurial action across international settings. Our objective was to explain...     

The Endogeneity of Optimum Currency Areas Criteria: Some Evidence from the European Union and Portugal

Observing the statistical relationship between business cycles correlation and trade intensity in the European Union, euro zone, and the Portuguese economy, we conclude that there is, in general, a positive effect that supports the endogeneity argument proposed by Frankel and Rose (The Economic Journal 108(449):pp. 1009–1025, 1998). However, if we analyse this relationship in sub-periods – 1967–1975, 1976–1985, 1986–1992, and 1993–2003 – we conclude that endogeneity hypothesis just hold in the first two, although the correlations are increasing. This could mean that, after the Single European Act in 1986, other forces beyond trade are contributing to business cycle synchronization. The Portuguese business cycle correlation with the European Union and the Euro zone had also increased in these four decades, despite the fact that endogeneity hypothesis is at a 90 percent confidence level. We also analyse the bilateral relationships between the Portuguese economy and the other European Union countries and find that the endogeneity is confirmed in just four cases: Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, and UK.     

Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales

In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.     

Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization

We study the sustainability of collusion in mixed oligopolies where private and public firms only differ in their objective: private firms maximize profits, while public firms maximize total surplus. If marginal costs are increasing, public firms do not supply the entire market, leaving room for private firms to produce and possibly cooperate by restricting output. The presence of public firms makes collusion among private firms harder to sustain, and maybe even unprofitable. As the number of private firms increases, collusion may become easier or harder to sustain. Privatization makes collusion easier to sustain, and is socially detrimental whenever firms are able to collude after privatization (which is always the case if they are sufficiently patient). Coordinated effects thus reverse the traditional result according to which privatization is socially desirable if there are many firms in the industry.