E-Business Transformation via Alliance Clusters

The number of firms using alliances as part of their corporate venturing or market entry strategies has surged over the past decade. Three common reasons cited for pursuing alliances are technology convergence, market access and alliance partners' complementary resources. This paper contrasts the alliance strategies of HP and IBM, two major competitors in electronic services (i.e. Internet-based 'e- service') businesses, using the Familiarity Matrix as a display tool to portray the strategies. Whereas the HP strategy is to attempt to establish its technology infrastructure as the standard e-services infrastructure on the Internet, IBM aims to position its IBM Global Services, rather than its technology, at the center of this ecosystem.     

Loanable Funds, Monitoring and Banking

This paper studies financial intermediation in a general equilibriumoverlapping generations model. Indivisible investment projects combine withinformational imperfections to create a (hidden action) moral hazard problemand introduce a role for third-party monitoring. Agency costs at theintermediary level are also considered. Under some conditions, monitors canbe viewed as banks facing a non-trivial portfolio diversification problem.Equilibria are derived in which a large nationwide bank coexists with anumber of community-regional banks, a structure of strong empiricalrelevance. Policies such as a mandatory reserve requirement are shown tohave substantial effects on the levels of investment in the economy.     

TRENDS IN RURAL WAGES,WEST JAVA, 1977–83

This paper examines monthly wage data collected by the Agro Economic Survey from seven villages in the Cimanuk River Basin of West Java, where data on agricultural and non-agricultural wages and prices of nine essential commodities were collected twice monthly between 1977 and 1983. Movements in money wages deflated by both the rice price and a weighted index of basic commodities are analysed in detail and differences between lowland and upland villages are discussed.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE (REVISITED): A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This paper explores the methodology of sectoral productivity growth measurement within the framework of input-output analysis. A method which ensures that sectoral productivity growth rates are consistent with productivity growth rates for the economy as a whole (as well as allowing for external trade) is suggested. New estimates are presented on total factor productivity in UK agriculture using a Tornqvist index procedure. In addition, new estimates of agricultural labour productivity growth are presented, taking account not only of labour employed in agriculture but also of labour employed in ancillary industries on the supply side. The empirical results confirm that part of the labour previously employed on farms has shifted “upstream” to industries providing agriculture with fertilises, machinery and other inputs.     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.