Artificial life

E-business processes between insurance companies and their private customers allow — in comparison to conventional business processing — savings in administrative expenses up to 30 per cent. However, today’s e-business processes are often described as little transparent and stereotyped. Users, therefore, complain them being far to complex and, as a consequence, do not accept them. Relating to research in the field of customer behaviour, it has been proved that even in e-business processes customers like to be contacted and treated individually. This can be reached by corresponding to the cognitive ability and the personal involvement of each customer. By using those mechanisms information processing becomes ?hospitable‘ or even ?human-alike‘. Chatter-bots simulate human behaviour in e-business processes and will possibly replace personnel in certain areas. Therefore, chatter-bots seem a suitable instrument to introduce successfully e-business processes between insurance companies and their private customers. Two positive consequences could be reached: first, process efficiency could be raised and second, cost-savings in processing could be gained.     

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.     

High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high‐water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high‐water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed‐form solution to the cost of the high‐water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.     

Ranking Journals Using Social Science Research Network Downloads

I use a new approach to rank journals, namely the number and percent frequency of articles a journal publishes that are heavily downloaded from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). I rank 18 accounting and finance journals, and I identify five journals not considered by the two most recent major published ranking studies of publications by accounting faculty, namely (in rank order): Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Accounting Studies, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting. I show that financial accounting faculties are more likely to post their working papers to SSRN, and papers posted by financial faculties generate more downloads. I mitigate this bias in favor of the financial area by providing separate rankings based on authors in the financial versus non-financial areas.