The Globalization–Welfare State Nexus Reconsidered

Two hypotheses relate to the globalization–welfare state nexus: the efficiency hypothesis predicts that globalization reduces government sector size and governments' capacity to finance the welfare state. The compensation hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that globalization induces a higher demand for social insurance which results in an extended welfare state. Empirical evidence on the globalization–welfare state nexus is mixed. The evidence is re‐examined by investigating a yearly panel dataset of 186 countries for the 1970–2004 period. This paper uses data compiled by the Penn World Tables on government sector size and employs the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF—Swiss Economic Institute) index of globalization. The results show that globalization increased government sectors around the world. Social globalization especially had a positive influence. Globalization‐induced effects were stronger in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries. Overall globalization and economic globalization reduced the relative price of government expenditures. These findings suggest that globalization does not jeopardize the welfare state at all.     

Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines how government ideology influenced privatization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition from socialism. We analyse a dataset of privatization indicators covering small‐ and large‐scale industries in 19 transition countries over the period 1990–2007 and introduce a government ideology index. The results suggest that market‐oriented governments promoted the privatization of small‐scale industries more than that of large‐scale ones. In the rapid transition process in the early 1990s, leftist governments stuck to public ownership more strongly than in the following period from the mid‐1990s to 2007. The remarkable differences between leftist and right‐wing governments concerning both the role of government in the economy and the basic elements of political order are in line with developments in OECD countries, and may also hold further implications for transition and democratizing countries outside Central and Eastern Europe.     

Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls

Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principal-agent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencies on the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevail and voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.