RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.     

It’s all about audit quality: Perspectives on strategic-systems auditing

We discuss the antecedents of and rationale for what has become known as Strategic-Systems Auditing (SSA). We also describe the conceptual foundation and key elements of SSA. We observe that the auditor employing SSA conceives the audit as a process of evidence-driven, belief-based, risk assessment. We also illustrate facets of this process, including how the auditor, by acquiring a rich understanding of how and how well management is executing its business-model, develops rich (e.g., distributional) expectations of future financial-statement amounts and disclosures. These expectations form a benchmark against which the auditor later compares and investigates management’s asserted financial-statement amounts and disclosures. Finally, we pose and respond to some of the more common questions about elements of SSA and complete the paper by suggesting some educational innovations and high-value targets for research.One salient message is that SSA first emerged in the 1990s as an attempt to enhance audit quality in response to changes in the audit environment. Another salient message is that SSA continues to equilibrate, adapting to more recent environmental changes, especially society’s demand for greater protection from financial-statement fraud. Such adaptation requires ongoing, significant intellectual investments by audit practitioners and audit scholars/educators.     

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm’s future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.     

Non-audit Services and Auditor Independence: New Zealand Evidence

Abstract:  This paper examines evidence in New Zealand about whether auditors providing more non-audit services are less independent. Three sets of tests are used to address the issue. The first examines whether there is a relation between non-audit fees and audit fees, the second examines whether there is a relation between non-audit fees and audit report qualification or modification, and the third examines whether there is a relation between non-audit fees and stability of audit tenure. The results suggest a potential for the impairment of auditor independence in appearance when auditors provide non-audit services but no evidence of any impact on independence of mind.     

The statistics of hunger

The author critically reviews commonly used statistics of food production, market supply, demand and consumption, and asserts the absolute necessity for a more discriminating form of analysis. He offers an alternative statistical and accounting technique designed to show a complete picture of the state of a country's overall food supply, and the food distribution to individual households at the same time.     

“You can try to press different emotional buttons”: The conflicts and strategies of eliciting emotions for fundraisers

In a competitive climate in which charities must increasingly rely on fundraising with the public, emotions such as hope, guilt, and fear are powerful tools that can be used strategically to secure donations or participation. This paper explores data from interviews with 23 fundraisers and voluntary sector workers, managers, and officials, to argue that decisions around how, why, and when to invest in the elicitation of emotion in fundraising are often difficult and conflicted, with some identifying a battle between ethics and effectiveness. We identify 3 key levels of conflict that must be negotiated: at the level of the charity sector, where the emotional ethics particularly of larger charities have been met with some resistance from the public and press; at the level of the organisation itself, where the ethics of representation are often a subject of conflict between fundraising and other departments such as policy; and, finally, at the experiential level of individual fundraisers themselves, who report being routinely internally conflicted around the rights and wrongs of using emotion in their work. A strategic approach to eliciting emotion emerges in the data as a useful way to address some of these areas of conflict, with fundraisers making careful “balancing” decisions about how and with whom to mobilise certain emotions at specific times.