DOES PRIVATIZATION FOSTER CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS?

We analyze the effect of privatization on the quality of legal institutions of governance. Our findings suggest that large-scale privatization (in terms of progress and volume) increases the risk of corruption in developing countries but has no effect on the legal institutions of governance (i.e., law and order and investor protection). The method of privatization (public share issues versus private sales) helps curb corruption and improve the quality of law enforcement and of investor protection. In developed countries, the progress and volume of privatization reduce the risk of corruption, and the method of privatization enhances the quality of law enforcement.     

A Synthetic Approach to Projecting Input–Output Tables

This paper describes an approach used in the Canadian input–output (IO) accounts, which seeks to enhance the timeliness of the tables. It combines traditional updating methods, balancing techniques and the most recent data. To assess the performance of this approach, aggregate estimates from the synthetic accounts are presented for two years, and compared with estimates from benchmarks and with estimates obtained from a mechanical estimation technique. The results show that most IO components can be estimated with a relatively small estimation error and that substantial accuracy is gained from using the synthetic approach compared with a mechanical technique. Results based on data which are two years away from IO benchmarks are obtained at the cost of large errors. Synthetic estimates of the IO accounts improve the timeliness problem by at least a full year.     

Board monitoring and capital structure dynamics: evidence from bank-based economies

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine the impact of board characteristics on the speed of adjustment and the capital structure dynamics of firms in bank-based economies. Using...