Career concerns and mandated disclosure

This paper examines the effects of mandated disclosure on the design of contracts and induced behavior in the presence of career concerns. We analyze the impact of two key properties of a mandated performance measure that is publicly disclosed: its sensitivity to the agent’s effort and its informativeness about the agent’s ability. We show conditions under which the agent’s effort (and the firm’s output) and the pay-for-performance weight critically depend on these two properties. In particular, when the mandated measure is sufficiently noisy, the pay-for-performance weight always decreases relative to a setting with no mandated measure. But when the mandated measure’s noise is close to that of the existing performance measure, the effect of a mandated measure on the pay-for-performance weight depends on the effort-sensitivity and informativeness of the measure. We also characterize settings where a mandated disclosure would be desirable or not; variations arise because mandated disclosures can increase both effort and risk. Our results imply that mandating the public disclosure of performance measures, particularly measures that are relatively informative about ability but are difficult to influence through managerial effort, may have the unintended consequence of generating inefficiencies in firms’ employment contracts.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

Downsizing decisions: The joint influence of equity incentives and behavioral biases

Although new investment can be viewed as a decision to pursue projects from a wide number of growth opportunities with easily discernible (and presumably preferable) risk profiles, downsizing (e.g., through layoffs, plant closings, asset divestitures, etc.) is a dichotomous choice to either abandon or continue an existing project where the relative risk between these options is not clear. Our evidence suggests that vega in the pre-downsizing period is associated with risky investment that necessitates future downsizing. We further find that contemporaneous vega is associated with a greater likelihood of downsizing. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that delta is a significant impediment to downsizing. We examine the influence of behavioral factors in the decision-making process and find downsizing decisions are discouraged by managerial overconfidence but encouraged by managers’ aversion to ambiguity. Finally, we investigate whether equity incentives and behavioral factors lead to better downsizing decisions. We find that downsizing firms with high ambiguity perform better after downsizing relative to their matched pair with lower ambiguity.     

Teaching Preparation and Placement in “Non‐top‐tier” Ph.D. Programs

In a recent article, Jacobson (2015) provides an invaluable economics job market guide for economics Ph.D. candidates from “non‐top‐tier” programs in the United States. Her treatment is detailed and, to a large extent, thorough. However, Jacobson fails to discuss the development of effective lead teaching experience in graduate school as a (potentially central) aspect of job market preparation. In the present comment, we develop and summarize a job posting and placement data set that focuses on Ph.D. candidates from non‐top‐tier programs. The data strongly suggests that the development of lead teaching experience in graduate school, rather than an optional line on one's vita, is an often pivotal element of realized job placement for Ph.D. candidates of non‐top‐tier programs. These findings corroborate with List's (2000) finding that, “a candidate's teaching portfolio was highly influential in the academic market” (p. 197). We also discuss the acquisition of lead teaching experience and benefits of early teaching experience that may extend beyond first job placement.     

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter

Operating performance and stock return results imply that managerswho commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if theywere to report truthfully, which would cause greater lossesfor managerial stockholdings than for options because of differencesin convexity. Fraud firms have significantly greater incentivesfrom unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestrictedstockholdings are their largest incentive source. Our resultsemphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status ofincentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraudfirms also have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihoodof fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud.     

Critical factors to consider in the development of an audit client engagement decision expert support system: a Delphi study of Big Six practicing auditors

The litigious audit environment is driving accounting firms to change their audit client engagement strategies in order to remain viable and successful in a very competitive environment. Firms are realizing the need to make better, more informed decisions regarding client acceptance/continuance decisions. Expert Support Systems are suggested as a useful tool for reengineering the audit client engagement decision. Towards this goal, this study uses the Delphi method with a panel of experts from the Big Six accounting firms to determine critical factors which may cause a firm to reject potential clients. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reading the room: Leveraging popular business books to enhance organizational performance

Managers need to think creatively about ways to improve organizational performance. We explore one such tool. Popular business books that offer unique takes on important topics can serve as an effective tool to engage workers and lead them to new understandings. In particular, we discuss the key insights for organizations offered by ten classic and popular bestselling business books. Each one offers enduring lessons of value for employees interested in helping their organizations become more successful.     

CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation

We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE. Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEOs choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEOs, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.