Top management's social capital and learning in new product development and its interaction with external uncertainties

This paper examines the effect of the elements of top management's social capital on exploratory and exploitative learning and on the outcomes of new product development (NPD), as well as the interaction effects of these elements with external uncertainties. In so doing, the study follows prior research that calls for a fine-grained analysis of how top management's social capital can positively affect NPD outcomes. Large-scale survey data (675 firms) from the United States, Germany, and Australia are used to develop and empirically validate a theoretical framework. As hypothesized, elements of top management's social capital have positive, but not identical, effects on exploitative and exploratory learning. In addition, the effects of structural social capital on learning, as well as the effects of learning on NPD outcomes, are significantly moderated by the interplay of technology uncertainty and demand uncertainty. The research concludes with implications for theory and practice.     

New forms of labour contract and labour flexibility in Russia

This paper assesses the claims that employment in the new Russian private sector relies heavily on informal and unregistered labour agreements and that the violation of existing labour law by new private employers is driven by their need for more flexible working arrangements.
The paper shows that these claims are unsupported on every count. The new private sector does not rely heavily on informal or illegal forms of employment and there is no evidence that it uses labour more flexibly, in any of the usual senses of the term, than the traditional sectors of the economy. The conclusion is that there is no economic justification for the systematic violation of the existing labour legislation. It is suggested, therefore, that enforcement of the existing law is a precondition for its effective reform in those areas in which it might be a barrier to restructuring.     

Taylor rules in the open economy

Taylor rules, which link short-term interest rates to fluctuations in inflation and output, have been shown to be a good guide (both positively and normatively) to the conduct of monetary policy. As a result they have been used extensively to model policy in the context of both closed and open economy models. Their determinacy properties have also been analysed in the context of closed and, to a more limited degree, in small open economy models. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the determinacy properties of Taylor rules to the case of a benchmark two-country model. When the rules are specified in terms of output-price inflation we confirm and extend the conventional results from the closed economy literature—satisfying the Taylor principle is the key to ensuring determinacy, although the presence of backward-looking price-setting can affect the determinacy properties of the two-country model. However, the conventional results do not hold when we replace output-price inflation with consumer price inflation in the specification of the rule. In this case, Taylor rules which satisfy the Taylor principle will be indeterminate, unless there is an unusually large home bias in consumption. Similar indeterminacy problems arise when one country targets CPI inflation and the other output-price inflation. In this case we show that, even if determinacy is achieved, large spillovers may occur between countries.     

Information congestion

Unsolicited advertising messages vie for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e‐mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message receivers supply attention according to average message benefit, while the marginal sender determines congestion. Costlier transmission may improve average message benefit so more messages are examined. Too many (too few) messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do‐Not‐Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate. The welfare results still hold when messages are presorted (triage).     

Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions is not as extreme as predicted and first movers do not attain their predicted first-mover advantage. In another parameterization we again find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted when the first mover is predicted to free ride, but we find strong support for equilibrium predictions when the second mover is predicted to free ride. These results can be explained by second movers' willingness to punish first movers who free ride, and unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute.     

Policy consequences of direct legislation theory, empirical models and evidence

Most theoretical models predict that institutions allowing for direct legislation should lead, on average, to policies more closely reflecting the wishes of the voters. While some agreement exists at the theoretical level about the expected policy consequences of direct legislation, empirical evidence has been scant so far. In this paper I discuss the reasons for this scantiness of empirical evidence, namely the intricacies of the adequate empirical model to test the theoretical proposition, and suggest possible solutions to this problem. Re-analyzing a dataset with which some authors have found no evidence in support of the theoretical claim, I show that with a better adapted empirical model we find results in synch with our theoretical expectations. Thus, policies in states that allow for direct legislation reflect on average more closely the voters?? wishes. Using Monte-Carlo simulations I also demonstrate the properties of the proposed estimator and suggest that it could be used in other contexts, like when assessing the responsiveness of legislators.     

Consumer and Retailer Promotions: Who is Better Off?

The long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very sparse. In this paper, I develop two 2-period models to investigate the impact on channel decisions and profits of manufacturer-controlled and retailer-controlled promotions targeted at consumers. My findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it optimal to not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales.