On the Stationarity of Current Account Deficits in the European Union

In this paper, we test for the stationarity of EU current account deficits. Our testing strategy addresses two key concerns with regard to unit‐root panel data testing, namely (i) the identification of which panel members are stationary, and (ii) the presence of cross‐sectional dependence. For this purpose, we employ an AR‐based bootstrap approach to the Hadri (2000 ) test. While there is only mixed evidence that current account stationarity applies when examining individual countries, this does not appear to be the case when considering panels comprising both EU and non‐EU members.     

Real interest parity: A note on Asian countries using panel stationarity tests

Existing panel data studies of real interest parity are either unable to identify which panel members are characterised by stationary real interest differentials, or are subject to size distortion resulting from the presence of structural breaks and cross-sectional dependencies. Using a panel stationarity testing procedure recently advocated by Hadri and Rao (2008) that allows for structural breaks and cross-sectional dependency, we are unable to reject the stationarity of Asian real interest rate differentials.     

Investment planning for irrigation development projects

This paper considers the problem of choosing among the technologies available for irrigation by tubewells to obtain an investment plan which maximizes the net agricultural benefits from a proposed project in a developing country. Cost and benefit relationships are derived and incorporated into a mathematical model which is solved using a modification of the dynamic programming procedure for solving the knapsack problem. The optimal schedule is seen to favor small capacity wells, drilled by indigenous methods, with supplementary water distribution systems.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.