Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

Debt-equity swaps and the heavily indebted countries

In search of solutions to the international debt crisis, attention has recently been focused on a new financing technique, so-called debt-equity swaps. An essential difference between these and the usual swapping of debt into equity is that the former allow a wider range of applications. The following article seeks to elucidate the possible contribution of debt-equity swaps towards easing the debt burden and to estimate the potential for a reduction in external debt and its effect on the balance of payments of the debtor nation.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.     

Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology

Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction.     

An axiomatic characterization of a generalized index of concentration

The Hannah-Kay [1977] generalized concentration index contains the well-known Herfindahl [1950]-Hirschman [1945] and the entropy indices as particular cases. In this papaer we show that the Hannah-Kay class can be regarded as a particular member of a generalized family of indices, which we refer to as self-weighted quasilinear means. We then show that among all self-weighted quasilinear means the Hannah-Kay family is the only class of concentration indices which satisfies the replication principle, a requirement which states that an m-fold replication of the industry, firm by firm, will multiply the concentration index by the factor 1/m.The refereeing process of this paper was handled through N.R. Adam.We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their suggestions.     

The short-term responsiveness of consumer expenditures in the Austrian economy

Zusammenfassung Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die kurzfristige Reagibilität von verschiedenen Konsumentenausgaben innerhalb eines theoretischen Rahmens, der alle Ausgabenkategorien symmetrisch behandelt, zu schätzen. Angesichts der Beschränkungen, die von den Daten her auferlegt werden, werden nicht alle Ausgabenkategorien in der Analyse berücksichtigt, aber die Parameter der Gleichungen der vernachlässigten Kategorien können kraft der Eigenschaften des Modells als Restgrößen bestimmt werden.Die Parameter der Gleichung für die Ausgaben für nichtdauerhafte Konsumgüter und Dienstleistungen sind konsistent mit der Auffassung, wie sie in der Life-Cycle Hypothese und der Permanenten-Einkommenshypothese formuliert wird, daß diese Konsumausgaben eher vom Vermögen als von der Liquidität beschränkt sind, und dem langfristigen Trend des verfügbaren Einkommens folgen. Dagegen reagieren die Ausgaben für dauerhafte Konsumgüter und die Aufnahme von Konsumkrediten sehr stark auf Erhöhungen der laufenden Einkommen.Die gesamten Konsumausgaben reagieren jedoch eher zögernd auf Einkommensänderungen, auch wenn diese als permanent betrachtet werden. Ein Anstieg der Einkommen um 1% bewirkt im Durchschnitt der folgenden vier Quartale eine Veränderung der Konsumausgaben um etwa 1/2%. Die Möglichkeit, die Wirtschaft durch eine flexible Handhabung von Änderungen in den Einkommensteuersätzen und in den Transfereinkommen zu stabilisieren, sind daher relativ beschränkt.     

A General Theory of Competition: Resources,Competences, Productivity,Economic Growth by Shelby D. Hunt

The Review of Austrian Economics -