Remark on a theorem by Gurland

Abstract

Let X ₁,X ₂,...,X _n be a random sample of size from a distribution with probability density function p(x|θ), where the unknown parameter θ belongs to a non-degenerate interval I. The unknown true value of θ will be denoted by θ₀.     

交易成本与新型农村合作医疗制度可持续发展

新型农村合作医疗制度的试点极大地推进了我国农村医疗保障制度的构建过程,但是该项制度推进并不顺利。本文试从交易成本理论视角,分析当前新农合制度存在较高的交易成本导致制度创新不足。在此基础上,本文提出要使新农合制度可持续发展,政府必须从制度完善和机制创新两个方面降低交易成本,以提高新农合制度绩效。     

Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective

The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy.     

A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation

Agents in a negotiation may have to negotiate multiple issues simultaneously. Automated multi-attribute negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements on multiple issues. Moreover, it also furnishes the opportunity to reach “win–win” solutions. In this paper, we first provide a survey that synthesizes the research on multi-attribute negotiation. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and conclude that three key issues need further study: incomplete information, Pareto optimality, and tractability. We then present a generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation with two new mechanisms that address the above issues. Finally, we discuss the challenges and directions for future work.     

Service quality gaps of business customers in the shipping industry

This paper extends the gaps model of [Zeithaml, V.A., Parasuraman, A., Berry, L. 1990. Delivering Quality Service: Balancing Customer Perceptions and Expectation. The Free Press, New York] from the service provider to the business customer side by examining two service quality (SQ) gaps. One is the SQ gap between types of business customers and the other is the SQ gap among employee statuses of business customers. Besides that, the five-factor SERVQUAL measure as the initial hypothesized model is also tested. The applicability of SERVQUAL to measuring the perceived SQ of customers in the shipping industry of Taiwan is rejected empirically. The existence of the two hypothesized gaps is verified by the method of MANOVA.     

The incremental value of a futures hedge using realized volatility

A number of prior studies have developed a variety of multivariate volatility models to describe the joint distribution of spot and futures, and have applied the results to form the optimal futures hedge. In this study, the authors propose a new class of multivariate volatility models encompassing realized volatility (RV) estimates to estimate the risk‐minimizing hedge ratio, and compare the hedging performance of the proposed models with those generated by return‐based models. In an out‐of‐sample context with a daily rebalancing approach, based on an extensive set of statistical and economic performance measures, the empirical results show that improvement can be substantial when switching from daily to intraday. This essentially comes from the advantage that the intraday‐based RV potentially can provide more accurate daily covariance matrix estimates than RV utilizing daily prices. Finally, this study also analyzes the effect of hedge horizon on hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness for both the in‐sample and the out‐of‐sample data. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 30:874–896, 2010     

治理型公司及其发展前景

传统的公司治理模式强调了权力制衡,目标是为了强化对公司内部人的控制和监督,而治理型公司模式则认为公司治理的核心不在干监督内部人而在于改善决策,目标是降低发生错误的可能性和加快纠正错误的速度。管理型公司反映了人性和组织行为的弱点,公司内部人的错误除非演变为灾难,否则不会得到纠正。在我国现有国情下,治理型公司的优势和前景非常明显,因此,它对我国公司治理改革具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

从文化要素的设计视角谈 旅行社专线产品同质化现象的解决之道

此文从文化要素的角度重新审视了旅行社专线产品,在分析了旅行社专线产品的同质化现状和文化要素的内涵后,明确了注入文化要素在旅行社专线产品设计中的重要性,并面向实践针对性地提出了产品设计中文化要素的选择策略。     

Stickiness of Rental Rates and Developers’ Option Exercise Strategies

In this study we incorporate sticky rents into a real options model to rationalize the widely documented overbuilding puzzle in real estate markets. Given the assumption that developers’ objective function is to maximize total revenue by selecting an optimal occupancy level, our model provides a better explanation of the phenomena we observed in the real world than the traditional market-clearance based real options models. We also show that developers’ exercise strategies can be affected by the size and the type of property markets. In other words, developers’ exercise strategies could differ among markets and under different conditions. Submitted to Cambridge—Maastricht 2005 Symposium.     

Authority and communication in the laboratory

We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed in another game in which the delegation outcome payoff-dominates the unique babbling communication outcome; yet there is a non-negligible fraction of principal-subjects who holds on to their authority and agent-subjects who transmits some information. A level-k analysis of the game indicates that a principal-subject “under-delegates” due to the belief that her less-than-fully-strategic opponent will provide information; such belief is in turn consistent with the actual play.