A Comparison of Willingness to Pay Estimation Techniques From Referendum Questions

Referendum style willingness to pay questions have been used to estimatepassive use values. This referendum question format method may beproblematic for many reasons, including the statistical techniques used toestimate willingness to pay from discrete responses. This paper comparesa number of parametric, semi-nonparametric and nonparametric estimationtechniques using data collected from US households regarding Federalprotection of endangered fish species.The advantages and disadvantagesof the various statistical models used are explored. A hypothesis test forstatistical equality among estimation techniques is performed using ajackknife bootstrapping method. When the equality test is applied, themodeling techniques do show significant differences in some possiblecomparisons, but only those that are nonparamentric. This can lead toconflicting interpretations of what the data show. Resource managers andpolicy analysts need to use caution when interpreting results until anindustry standard can be developed for estimating willingness to pay fromclosed ended questions.     

EXPLAINING RISING INEQUALITY: SKILL‐BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND NORTH–SOUTH TRADE*

Abstract We review the ‘skill‐biased technological change (SBTC) versus North–South trade (NST)’ debate in order to explain widening wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The traditional explanations based on exogenous SBTC and on the North–South Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson approach, as well as the early estimates that diagnosed a clear prevalence of the former, are firstly exposed and discussed. A presentation is then made of the recent theoretical literature that endogenizes SBTC, introduces new channels of impacts from NST, and combines both explanations. Finally, the current estimates show that (i) both explanations are relevant, (ii) their impacts differ according to industries and countries, (iii) outsourcing is the main vector of impact from NST and (iv) SBTC and NST interact.     

On the path-dependence of economic growth

The cumulated growth of an economy during a period of time depends on the whole economical history during this period and not only of the situation at the beginning and at the end of the interval. However, if some constraint is made on the set of possible economies, this phenomenon of history-dependence may disappear. We give a simple necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint for this to happen, generalizing results of Samuelson–Swamy and Hulten. Our approach is different, based on differential and symplectic geometry. We also solve the same question for a subsector of the economy.     

Institutional changes, wars and stock market risk in an emerging economy: evidence from the Israeli stock exchange, 1945–1960

In an effort to understand the determinants of economic growth in an emerging economy, we analyze the effects of institutional reforms, wars and political events on the risk level of the Israeli stock market between 1945 and 1960. We find that the anticipation of wars did not have any effect but the end of skirmishes actually raised the risk on the stock market. Domestic political instability also increased the stock market risk. Finally we find that most legal reforms did not matter much.

The shared reward dilemma on structured populations

In this paper we study the recently introduced “shared reward dilemma” (Cuesta et al. in J Theor Biol 251:253–263, 2008) in the presence of a structure governing the interactions among the population. The shared reward dilemma arises when the prisoner’s dilemma is supplemented with a second stage in which a fixed reward is equally distributed among all cooperators. We first extend our previous results on the equilibrium structure of this game to the case of a one-shot game taking place on a regular network. Subsequently, we consider an evolutionary version of the game on both lattices and random networks. We show that the evolutionary game on graphs exhibits important differences with the case of well-mixed populations. In particular, there exists an important parameter range in which the cooperation is boosted and a single cooperator can invade a population of defectors. We study the dependence of the cooperation levels on the neighborhood size, finding that on random networks the level of cooperation reached decreases as the neighborhood size increases. Moreover, square lattices favor cooperation more than random networks, and on them cooperation may be almost full for certain parameter regions even for large neighborhood sizes. Further, we show that the effect of the population structure is never detrimental for cooperation. We interpret our results in terms of weak versus strong temptation and discuss the nontrivial issues involved in trying to promote cooperation exogenously by means of such a reward mechanism.     

Consumers’ preference modeling to price bundle offers in the telecommunications industry: a game with competition among operators

Network operators are merging their services, such as fixed or wireless telephony, internet or television, into single offers, called bundles. It is essential to understand consumers’ preferences to define the most profitable bundles, with their associated prices, especially in the fierce competitive current market. We start by defining a random linear utility model and then, analyze the competition between an integrated operator and new entrants proposing substitutable services. Each operator ignores the consumers’ reservation prices for his offers and has to deal with uncertainties about the marketing strategies of competitors, due to potential different size and cost structure. A two-level game is introduced and solved by backward induction. In the second level, the operators determine their optimal offer prices for each possible combination of marketing strategies while the consumers select their most profitable purchasing processes; the natural framework is that of Bayesian game theory. Finally at the top level, knowing the outcome of the other level, the operators identify which marketing strategy to use between market share expansion, segment targeting or multi-level price discrimination, to maximize their expected utilities conditionally to their private informations.     

Durbin’s random substitution and conditional Monte Carlo

Durbin (Biometrika 48:41–55, 1961) proposed a method called random substitution, by which a composite problem of goodness-of-fit can be reduced to a simple one. In this paper we provide a method of finding the p-value of any test statistic, for a composite goodness-of-fit problem, based on the simulation of a large number of conditional samples, using an analog of Durbin’s proposal in a reverse-type application. We analyze a Bayesian chi-square test proposed in Johnson (Ann Stat 32:2361–2384, 2004) which relies on a single randomization and relate it with Durbin’s original method. We also review a related proposal for conditional Monte-Carlo simulation in Lindqvist and Taraldsen (Biometrika 92:451–464, 2005) and compare it with our procedure. We show our method in a non-group example introduced in Lindqvist and Taraldsen (Biometrika 90:489–490, 2003).     

Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.     

Money matters: an axiomatic theory of the endowment effect

We develop a framework that allows us to state precisely the relationship between leading concepts of the theoretical and empirical research on reference-dependent preferences, namely the status quo bias, the endowment effect and the willingness to accept (WTA)/willingness to pay (WTP) gap. We show that a monetary version of the status quo bias is a necessary condition for the WTA/WTP gap, and show how to factor out the part of the gap due to income effects from the part of the gap due to the endowment effect. As a byproduct, we show that reference-dependent phenomena are generated by reference-independent factors, i.e., an underlying reference-independent preference relation the properties of which are discussed at length.