Position limits for cash‐settled derivative contracts

Cash settlement of derivative contracts makes them susceptible to manipulation by traders who expect to close large positions upon final settlement. Cash settlement also increases underlying volatility when hedgers unwind their hedges if they have no incentives to control their trading costs. Limits on the positions that traders can carry into final settlement can be used to mitigate associated economic inefficiencies when surveillance is insufficient. This article develops a model that regulators can use to set these limits that is based upon microstructure theory. The empirical findings indicate that existing position limits are largely inconsistent with those suggested by the model. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:945–965, 2005     

A new system to finance the United Nations

The end of the Cold War has not delivered a peace dividend but, paradoxically, a peace penalty on the United Nations. This article argues that revision of the existing funding arrangements is inadequate and that a radical restructuring of the financial system is a prerequisite for successful multilateralism.     

Human capital and the internationalisation of venture capital firms

We examine the neglected area of internationalisation by VCs. Using a representative sample of 195 VCs, we show that the decision of a European VC firm to invest internationally is driven by its human resources. Having more VC executives in general and more VC executives with previous international experience in specific, results in a higher probability of investing internationally. In contrast, more VC executives with experience in the VC industry or with an engineering background lead to a higher probability of remaining domestic.     

Seasonality and non-linear price effects in scanner-data-based market-response models

Scanner data for fast moving consumer goods typically amount to panels of time series where both N and T are large. To reduce the number of parameters and to shrink parameters towards plausible and interpretable values, Hierarchical Bayes models turn out to be useful. Such models contain in the second level a stochastic model to describe the parameters in the first level.     

Binary effectivity rules

A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization.     

Consumer reporting: A conceptual framework for the organizational level

In this paper, a conceptual framework for consumer reporting at the organizational level is developed. Consumer reporting is defined as the provision of information by an organization to its consumers with respect to the effects of its activities judged relevant by those consumers. In this context, the term organization covers business firms but also governmental agencies, hospitals, charities, and other non-profit organizations with relations to their consumers/clients.The concept of consumer satisfaction is regarded as the core element of consumer reporting. Several issues with respect to consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction as well as their measurement are discussed. It is concluded that perceptual indicators of consumer satisfaction should constitute the core of consumer reporting in establishing the consumer profile of the organization. However, additional information could be provided too, for instance situational indicators of consumer satisfaction or information about consumer dissatisfaction. All of this information should be geared towards the goal of accounting for the resulting organizational strategy and policies towards the consumers. Several practical examples are given to illustrate the items about which information can be provided and the fact that consumer reporting can be realized in practice.

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Berichterstattung von Organisationen für Verbraucher: ein konzeptioneller Rahmen

Zusammenfassung Eine solche Berichterstattung wird im vorliegenden Beitrag definiert als Informationen einer Organisation für ihre Konsumenten über diejenigen Wirkungen ihrer Aktivitäten, die von diesen Konsumenten für wichtig gehalten werden. Der Begriff Organisation steht hier nicht nur für kommerzielle Firmen, sondern auch für Behörden, Krankenhäuser, Stiftungen und andere nicht gewinnorientierte Organisationen mit ihren jeweiligen Beziehungen zu ihren Verbrauchern bzw. Klienten.Das Konzept der Verbraucherzufriedenheit steht dabei im Mittelpunkt. Deshalb werden zunächst dieses Konzept und die Methoden zur Messung von Verbraucherzufriedenheit diskutiert. Ergebnis ist dabei, daß das Konsumentenprofil einer Organisation durch perzipierte Indikatoren ermöglicht wird. Figur 1 gibt hierfür ein Beispiel. Das Konsumentenprofiel kann durch situative Indikatoren und durch Informationen über Verbraucherzufriedenheit ergänzt werden (Figur 2). Alle diese Informationen sollten zum Ziel haben, die Unternehmenspolitik gegenüber den Konsumenten zu verantworten.Zum Schluß werden einige praktische Beispiele behandelt, die einerseits zeigen, welche Informationen solche Berichterstattungen enthalten können, und andererseits, daß es in der Praxis bereits Ansätze in dieser Richtung gibt.

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Hans Kasper is Associate Professor of Marketing and Hein Schreuder Professor of Business Economics at the Faculty of Economics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, NL-6200 MD Masstricht, The Netherlands.     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

Bandwagon mergers,international competitiveness,and government policy

This paper suggests that while the static welfare losses of merger predilections among Western firms may not be dramatic, they may lead to substantial dynamic losses when merger-prone firms need to compete with firms which instead focus on equipment investment and investments in R&D. It is suggested that such diverging investment priorities have been the real cause of the deteriorating competitiveness of many of the largest Western enterprises vis-à-vis their Japanese rivals. While mergers are generally taken to be determined by either efficiency or monopoly considerations, this paper argues that Western merger predilections are likely to be generated by a combination of imitative and defensive routines as well. That would make it difficult for firms to unilaterally break away from these competitiveness-threatening investments. If correct, this would imply that competition policies would need to be refocused. However, it is also suggested that the implications for international competitiveness should make merger questions a subject of industrial policies too. In that respect, the paper suggests some basic attitudinal changes.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy conference in Vienna and at a EUNIP workshop at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. Financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (contract nos. 54473 and 57305) and the European Commission (contract no. ERB CHRX CT94-0454), research assistance from Michel Renirie and Chee-Wai Chan, and helpful comments from the conference and workshop participants, especially Kurt Bayer and Keith Cowling, are gratefully acknowledged. Only the author is responsible for the contents of, and any flaws in the paper.     

On the theory of cost sharing

This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a -cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement -cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments.