Global Food Chains, African Smallholders and World Bank Governance

This paper critically examines the World Bank's analysis of the development of agribusiness in Africa in the World Development Report 2008 in relationship to its governance policies, which seek to introduce institutional reforms to promote private and public sector linkages with the participation of civil society. The paper argues that this confuses food chain governance (control over quality and the logistics of production) with democratic governance and essentially promotes oligopolization of the food industry and the interests of the powerful in the name of smallholder farmers.     

Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound

In an economy where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is an occasionally binding constraint and the government lacks a commitment technology, it may be desirable for society to appoint a policymaker who cares less about government spending stabilization relative to inflation and output gap stabilization than the private sector does. A policymaker of this type uses government spending more elastically to stabilize the economy. At the zero lower bound, the anticipation of aggressive fiscal expansions in future liquidity trap situations increases inflation expectations and lowers real interest rates, thereby mitigating the decline in output and inflation.     

DEBT CRISIS, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, AND GROWTH: SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This paper analyzes some dynamic aspects of trade liberalization reforms within the context of the debt crisis. In particular, the paper discusses issues concerning intensity of liberalization, speed of trade reform, and the interaction between liberalization and stabilization. It deals with analytical issues and draws from the empirical experiences of some highly indebted Latin American countries.     

HOUSING WEALTH AND U.S. MONEY DEMAND: A PANEL ESTIMATION

This article estimates a panel model for U.S. money demand using annual state‐level data for the period from 1977 to 2008. We incorporate housing wealth in the demand‐for‐money function and find strong evidence of a relationship between a broad monetary aggregate and housing wealth. This finding is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring financial heterogeneity across U.S. regions. Breaking up the sample in two subperiods shows that panel estimates including housing wealth yield more stable coefficients than both time‐series estimates and panel estimates excluding housing wealth. We also show that the link between money and housing wealth predates the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle. (JEL E41, E52)     

Factor Endowments,Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector‐specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a specific factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade flows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents’ utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor, and skilled workers). We then use those ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how differences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land)–abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource–abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.     

WAGNER'S LAW REVISITED: A NOTE FROM SOUTH AFRICA

The aim of this note is to reassess the validity of Wagner's law for South Africa for the period 1950‐2007 using cointegration and causality tests. The evidence shows causality running from income to government expenditure, thus supporting the Wagnerian proposition of an expanding public sector. Using five different long‐run estimators, we found that the size of South Africa's public sector was positively and significantly related to South Africa's national income. The elasticity ranges from 1.12 to 1.57, implying that a 1% increase in income leads to a 1.12‐1.57% increase in government expenditure.     

The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement

Although legal sanctions are often nondeterrent, we frequently observe compliance with “mild laws.” A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. Mild laws nevertheless give scope for a potentially large, positive welfare effect, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower social enforcement costs.     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.