Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Nonresponse Bias and Stimulus Effects in the Dutch National Election Study

Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias.     

Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.     

Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994).     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.