Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

A dyadic approach to the impact of differences in organizational culture on relationship performance

The authors extend previous research on relationship management by investigating the potential effect of differences in organizational culture on relationship performance among 124 dyads. Theory suggests that partner similarity may improve the feeling of we-ness thereby contributing to the perceived success of inter-firm cooperation. The findings reveal that differences in organizational culture are larger in less successful inter-firm relationships, but do not influence the perceived relationship success significantly. Our results suggest that relationship managers should not confuse compatibility with similarity; personal chemistry is important for relationship atmosphere but does not solely depend on similarities. Future research in this area may wish to concentrate on a more complete measure of organizational (sub)culture(s), the different levels of analysis (personal, organizational, dyad), relationship life cycles (stage models) and the role of organizational identity.     

How Productive Is Workplace Health and Safety?

In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of workplace health and safety practices on firm performance, using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data merged with unique cross‐sectional representative firm survey data on work environment conditions. We estimate standard production functions, augmented with workplace environment indicators, addressing both time‐invariant and time‐varying potentially relevant unobservables in the production process. We find positive and large productivity effects of improved physical dimensions of the health and safety environment, specifically, “internal climate” and “monotonous repetitive work”.     

Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.     

Mehrwert für die Marke durch Kommunikation schaffen

Marken ohne Mehrwert haben keine Existenzberechtigung. Nicht immer liegt der Mehrwert jedoch im Produkt oder der Dienstleistung selbst. Vielmehr kann die Kommunikation selbst einen Mehrwert für Marken schaffen. Deshalb wird im folgenden Beitrag gezeigt, wie man den Markenmehrwert einerseits klar kommunizieren und andererseits durch die Kommunikation selbst Mehrwert zum Nutzen für den Kunden und für das Unternehmen schaffen kann.     

Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens

We present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries. In the first part of the paper, we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does not necessarily attract all shifted profits. Under this assumption, tax competition between a large number of identical countries may lead to either a symmetric equilibrium with no profit shifting or an asymmetric equilibrium where firms shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. In the second part of the paper, we introduce tax havens. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, tax havens unambiguously reduce the tax revenue of countries due to a ‘leakage effect’ — tax havens attract tax base from countries — and a ’competition effect’ — the optimal response to the increased tax sensitivity of tax bases involves a reduction of tax rates. Starting from an asymmetric equilibrium, however, tax havens also raise the tax revenue of countries through a ’crowding effect’ — tax havens make it less attractive to compete for profits and thus induce low-tax countries to become high-tax countries. We demonstrate that the latter effect may dominate the former effects so that countries, on balance, benefit from the presence of tax havens.