On Learning to Cooperate

This paper shows that experimentation can have the effect of inducing outcomes that are “far” from Nash in a learning model similar to that studied by D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine (1993, Econometrica61, 547-573). The game under consideration is a version of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the average length of players' lifetimes is arbitrarily large, but fixed. If the number of stages in the prisoner's dilemma is sufficiently large, then experimentation induces cooperation within the society on an arbitrarily large scale, even though the beliefs of almost all players are eventually within an arbitrary η>0 of being correct at all of the information sets in the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.     

Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction

Synopsis This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman discrete-time model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game – open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent – on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. Due to the special structure of the model, the open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases, and that may include the Pareto-optimal outcome in some cases. The level of efficiency of equilibrium behaviour is thus U-shaped as a function of the level of information the agents’ extraction strategies are based on. The analysis suggests that in environments characterized by a dynamic (and no market) externality, forcing agents to commit to open-loop behavior would constitute welfare-improving regulation.     

Business Cycles, the Exchange Rate, and Demand for Antidumping Protection in Mexico

Antidumping actions in the US and EU are known to be linked to macroeconomic conditions. In part, this is because positive injury findings may be easier to make in a downturn, increasing the chance of success for complainants. We explore the evidence for Mexico, one of the main “new” antidumping regimes. Injury determination is also critical in Mexico’s antidumping policy, as a majority of unsuccessful complaints have been rejected because of negative injury findings rather than negative findings of dumping. Working with data from 1987 to 2000, we provide evidence for a relationship between macroeconomic factors and antidumping complaints, including current account and exchange rate movements, and both local and global general macroeconomic conditions.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Capital investment and determinants of financial constraints in Estonia

Unlike previous empirical work concerning investment behavior and the determinants of liquidity constraints, we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially unconstrained regime. By using new panel data for Estonian companies during 1993–2002 we find that: (i) investment behavior is characterized by two distinct regimes; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) the actual probabilities of operating in the financially constrained regime are quite high and essentially stable during the whole period under consideration; (iv) ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints.     

Modelling Entrepreneurship: Unifying The Equilibrium and Entry/Exit Approach

Two approaches can be distinguished with respect to modelling entrepreneurship: (i) the approach focusing on the net development of the number of entrepreneurs in an equilibrium framework and (ii) the approach focusing on the entries and exits of entrepreneurs. In this paper we unify these approaches to arrive at a model explaining the equilibrium and actual number of entrepreneurs and the entry and exit rate of entrepreneurs simultaneously and consistently. We apply our unified approach to the Netherlands using self-employment data for the 1960–1999 period. We find error-correction of about 20% per year and a very different situation in terms of disequilibrium before and after the early 1980s. Periods of high unemployment appear to be characterized by both high entry and high exit rates.     

Malthus in cointegration space: evidence of a post-Malthusian pre-industrial England

This paper re-examines the interaction between population growth and income per capita in pre-industrial England. Our results suggest that, as early as two centuries preceding the Industrial Revolution, England had already escaped the Malthusian Epoch and entered a post-Malthusian regime, where income per capita continued to spur population growth but was no longer stagnant. Our formulation of a post-Malthusian hypothesis implies cointegration between vital rates (birth- and death rates) and income and builds explicitly on a simple model of Malthusian stagnation. We show that this hypothesis can be interpreted as an extension of the latter model where the negative Malthusian feedback effect from population on income, as implied by diminishing returns to labor, is offset by a positive Boserupian and/or Smithian scale effect of population on technology.