Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

A model of project evaluation with limited attention

Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work.     

The role of capital investment project teams in organisational learning

The management and organisation of capital projects in the British National Health Service (NHS) is dependent upon project teams. An analysis of four case studies shows how these teams also act as agents of learning for individuals and the organisation. This article considers the process by which learning came about. In particular it identifies the ability of the project teams to develop a parallel organisation within a wider organisational context. These teams develop specific rules, roles and relationships which help individual project team members to more effectively share their knowledge with others and their organisation.     

IMPLEMENTING A TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT IN THE WTO: WHAT MAKES SENSE?

Abstract.  In the Doha Round, trade facilitation is the negotiating issue in which the 'implementation issue' is most prominent. At the WTO (the Doha Development Agenda) the international community has approached the implementation problem as a challenge to restore mercantilist balance rather than as a need to build good economics into future agreements. The international community has taken on aggressively the development dimensions of trade facioitation through the development banks, bilateral aid agencies and other specialized institutions. Considerable funding has been provided. Though little progress has been made through WTO negotiations, the content of these development programs is supportive of development.     

Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments

This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernments optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile.     

Mill's ‘proof’ of Utility and the composition of causes

John Stuart Mill proposed that all policy precepts, be they in the areas of morality or prudence or aesthetics, are all subordinate to the precepts of the Art of Life. The value which he assumes in defining the Art of Life is the Principle of Utility. This principle, being normative rather than fact, can admit of no proof based solely on deductive inference. Yet Mill proposed considerations that he believed capable of rationally persuading one to accept his principle as the basic principle for the Art of Life. This paper aims to evaluate this argument. In particular, it tries to show that a crucial step, often thought to be a logical howler, is not to be so simply dismissed. It is shown that if one accepts certain theses from Mill's philosophy of science and of social science, concerning the composition of causes, then the crucial step is fully justified. It is also suggested that these theses of Mill's philosophy of science are mistaken. So Mill's proof of utility is, after all, unsound, but the reconstruction proposed shows it to be much more plausible and much more philosophically interesting than is often thought.     

WHOM YOU CONNECT WITH MATTERS: DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND FIRM LOCATION

We examine whether board members serve as a channel for remotely located firms to access the benefits from business‐dense areas due to economies of agglomeration. We find that geographically remote firms benefit from connections to firms in top metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) for business density. After controlling for director compensation, we find connections to top MSA firms mitigate the negative effect of increased distance from business‐dense areas. We address concerns of endogeneity by exploring a sample of firms whose directors gain board seats at top MSA firms and find a similar positive impact of connections to top MSA firms.