Beyond the need to boast: Cost concealment incentives and exit in Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it can exclude its competitors from the market. Hence, the rankings of expected profit and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the inefficient firms is possible. Although the efficient firm has stronger incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there remain cases in which the firm conceals information in equilibrium to induce exit.     

Job auctions and hold-ups

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which firms need to invest in capital before they can post a vacancy. This assumption creates a natural scope for hold-up problems, but the innovation of our study is that we allow for competition among the applicants who apply for the same job. In our economy all applicants are paid their actual marginal product. Nonetheless, with random search there exists a hold-up problem, leading to underinvestment in capital. On the contrary, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex-post bargaining that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.     

On randomization, modeling and experimental design: some remarks on a paper by De Vos

De Vos (1991) claims to have discovered a new example from agricultural field experimentation which shows that a simple robust spatial model may lead to inference and systematic experimental design that outperforms the inference from randomized experiments by far. In this reaction it is shown that: (1) the example is not new; (2) the gains in efficiency are exaggerated due to comparison with an inefficient randomization method; (3) the paper is over-optimistic with respect to robustness of model-based methods and throws unjustified doubts on the validity of randomization methods; (4) the choice between randomization methods and model-based methods depends on the relative importance attached to efficiency and validity.     

Thirty-second international Atlantic Economic conference October 3–6, 1991 Washington,D.C.

Thirty-second international Atlantic Economic conference October 3–6, 1991 Washington, D.C.     

Capital Utilisation in Indonesian Medium and Large Scale Manufacturing∗

This article presents the main results of a survey of the utilisation of existing productive capacity in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. It was found that although prevailing levels of capital utilisation in Indonesian manufacturing do not appear to be out of line with levels observed in other developing countries, there is scope for improvement in some sectors. The paper suggests some policy reforms which would improve the competitive environment for Indonesian manufacturing and increase the price ratio of capital to labour, thus promoting more intensive capital utilisation in the manufacturing sector.

     

Bias and Sensitivity of Multipliers

Multipliers measure the derivatives of endogenous variables with respect to exogenous shocks and are functions of the structural parameters of an economic model. Substitution of the structural parameter estimates yields a so-called derived estimate for a multiplier or any reduced-form parameter. Derived estimates are biased. This paper presents first-order approximations to the biases and sensitivities of multipliers. The good performance of a flawed formula in input–output analysis is illuminated.     

How to predict transfer of training? Investigating the application of the unified model of task-specific motivation

Transfer motivation is an important factor influencing transfer of training. However, earlier research often did not investigate transfer motivation as a multidimensional construct. The unified model of task-specific motivation (UMTM) takes into account that (transfer) motivation is multidimensional by including both affective and cognitive motivational components and their antecedents. Prior research has provided evidence that the UMTM can predict self-reported transfer of training, but is unclear whether it also can predict transfer reported by expert external raters. Moreover, it is unclear whether controlling for prior knowledge matters for the relationship between transfer motivation and transfer of training. This study improves on existing research by accounting for both of these gaps in the literature. Data were collected among 299 participants who filled in a questionnaire about the UMTM components directly after attending a writing training. They also handed in written documents before, and 6 weeks after the training, which were rated on transfer by trainers. Outcomes showed that components of the UMTM positively predict externally reported transfer when prior knowledge was controlled for. The outcomes imply that the UMTM has predictive value for transfer of training and points out which factors influence whether transfer does or does not occur.