The Co‐initial Swap Market Model

In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to the pricing and the risk management of generic European style interest‐rate derivatives. This new model has great flexibility and has the advantage of avoiding complex model calibration techniques typical of standard short‐rate models. Dynamics is assigned on a set of co‐initial forward swap rates, and arbitrage‐free restrictions are determined in a normal and lognormal setup. Model implementation and calibration are discussed, and details of two example applications are also presented.
(J.E.L.: G12, G13).     

Protectionism, Trade, and Measures of Damage from Exotic Species Introductions

Unintentional introductions of nonindigenous plants, animals, and microbes cause significant ecological and agricultural crop damage worldwide. Trade in both manufactured and agricultural goods is a primary vector for such introductions. Fusing simple models of trade and biological introductions, we explore the links between trade, protectionism, and damage arising from exotic species introductions. We show that it is possible for freer trade to reduce damage arising from exotic species invasions. We also show how current measures of damage—heavily weighted toward agricultural damage—serve as misleading indicators of how restrictions to trade affect total losses arising from exotic species introductions.     

Ricardian Equivalence and Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan

The present paper asks whether there is a limit to the potential for government spending to stimulate output in the Japanese economy. Overlapping generations and Ricardian infinite horizon representative agent models are developed, in which the government spending multiplier falls as the level of spending rises. Consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis, vector autoregressions (VAR) indicate that the timing of taxes has little impact on national output. Conversely, the impact of government spending is significant. However, using non–linear VAR techniques, the author finds empirical evidence for the hypothesis of a regime–dependent government spending multiplier that falls as spending rises.     

Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model

This paper introduces a notion of consistency for the probabilistic assignment model, which we call probabilistic consistency. We show that the axioms equal treatment of equals and probabilistic consistency characterize the uniform rule, which is the rule which randomizes uniformly over all possible assignments.     

Is business ethics philosophy or sophism?

The contrast between the philosopher and the sophist is subtle and significant. The significant difference is identified by Socrates when he claims, in the Apology 21d, to be the wisest man in Athens: “Neither of us has any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance.” Nearly two and one half millennia later, business ethics has transported street corner conversation into the meeting room and board room, where ethical leadership is cultivated or stifled. Are these conversations about ethics philosophy, or are they sophism? In this paper, I will evaluate the philosophical soundness of business ethics as it is practiced in business situations. My objective will be to outline the unfulfilled value of philosophical wisdom to ensuring the value of business ethics, and business, to society at large.     

Combining Revealed and Stated Preferences: Consistency Tests and Their Interpretations

This article models the recreation demand for Iowa wetlands, combining survey data on both actual usage patterns (i.e., revealed preferences (RPs)) and anticipated changes to those patterns under hypothetical increases in trip costs (i.e., stated preferences (SPs)). We formulate and test specific hypotheses concerning potential sources of bias in each approach and discuss what can be learned about the validity of the models from such tests.     

Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation

A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory). Although advantaged bidders are close to making best responses to disadvantaged bidders, the latter bid much more aggressively than in equilibrium, thereby earning negative average profits. Experienced bidders consistently bid closer to the Nash equilibrium than inexperienced bidders, although these adjustments towards equilibrium are small and at times uneven.