The Role of Perceived Organizational Performance in Organizational Identification,Adjustment and Job Performance*

abstract Favourable organizational status and prestige has a substantial role in shaping constituents' attitudes and actions. The status and prestige of an organization is often a reflection of its achievements or performance. In the present study, we investigate the role of organizational performance or achievement (as assessed by organizational members) in evoking employees' identification, adjustment, and job performance. The results of this study indicate that two forms of organizational performance (labelled as perceived social responsibility and development and perceived market and financial performance) are associated with organizational identification. However, when compared to perceived market and financial performance, perceived social responsibility and development had a larger effect on organizational identification, which in turn resulted in enhanced employees' work outcomes – adjustment and job performance.     

Existence of competitive equilibrium when incomes may be zero

Summary In a pure exchange economy, there exists a price vector which is a quasi-equilibrium (Debreu 1962), but this may not be a competitive equilibrium if some individuals' demand functions are discontinuous because their incomes may be zero. We show nonetheless, in a pure exchange economy with free disposal, that there is asequence of prices approaching the quasi-equilibrium along which total excess demands tend to a non-positive limit.Comments on earlier drafts from K. J. Arrow, D. Duffie, H. E. Scarf, and D. Schmeidler are gratefully acknowledged.     

Competition Policy and Innovation

The question addressed by the paper is whether standard proceduresand widely accepted insights of competition policy remain validwhen one deals with potentially anti-competitive conduct ininnovative industries. The question of appropriateness arisesbecause competition in these industries displays features thatare radically different from those encountered in traditionalsectors of the economy. Competition is for the market ratherthan in the market, dynamic aspects of competition matter morethan allocative aspects, intellectual property rights (IPR)reinforce network effects present in knowledge-based industries.The paper examines why these differences matter with respectto market delineation, assessment of intensity of competition,and predatory conduct. It also raises the question as to whatextent competition law limits the innovators' rights not tolicense their inventions to others, especially when they correspondto essential facilities. It explores the problem created byexcessive protection as well as the hold-up problem that arisesin a context of sequential innovations. It examines the antitrustposition in regard to the treatment of collaborative arrangementsamong holders of IPRs, such as cross-licences, patent-pools,and joint-standard settings. Finally, it presents a discussionon a possible role of competition law in shaping intellectualproperty laws in order to benefit from the complementarity betweenintellectual protection and antitrust rules.     

The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions

This is an exploration of how bidding behavior of firms in variousauctions is affected by their capital structure. The theoreticalmodel considers a first-price sealed bid and an English auction.We find that as debt levels increase, firms tend to reduce theirbids. The lower bids give the competition incentives to reducetheir bids as well. These results are investigated empiricallyusing data from the 1994–1995 FCC spectrum auctions. Consistentwith the theoretical model, higher debt levels of the biddingfirm and of the competition tend to lead to lower bids. Additionaldeterminants of bidding behavior in these auctions are alsoanalyzed.     

Allocative and distributional effects of a monopolistic cooperative firm in a capitalist economy

It is well known that labor-managed firms operating under socialism exhibit “bizarre” behavior with respect to their production strategy. We prove that under capitalism most of these distortions disappear, consequently, the production strategies of an entrepreneurial monopoly and of the labor-managed firm become indistinguishable. However, there appears an almost inherent instability in the distribution of profits. The degree of instability depends on the existence of some sort of supportive legislation. Thus, unlike under socialism, in a capitalistic economy the labor-managed firm may have an effect on the distribution of profits at most.     

A note on an application of the trade-off method in evaluating a utility function

In this note we suggest a possible use for the trade-off technique to exclude possible forms of the utility function that are common to the same set of assumptions. Out discussion is focused on the specific case of two attributes. This case is becoming more common in coping with practical problems in the healthcare field, where the two attributes are life years and health status.     

Short‐Time Compensation as a Tool to Mitigate Job Loss? Evidence on the U.S. Experience During the Recent Recession

During the recent recession only seventeen states offered short‐time compensation (STC)—prorated unemployment benefits for workers whose hours are reduced for economic reasons. Federal legislation passed in 2012 will encourage the expansion of STC. Exploiting cross‐state variation in STC, we present new evidence indicating that jobs saved during the recession as a consequence of STC may have been significant in manufacturing, but that the overall scale of the STC program was generally too small to have substantially mitigated aggregate job losses in the seventeen states. Expansion of the program is necessary for STC to be an effective countercyclical tool in the future.     

An experimental study on real-options strategies

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether people intuitively use real-option strategies in a dynamic investment setting. The participants were asked to play as an oil manager and make production decisions in response to a simulated mean-reverting oil price. Using cluster analysis, participants can be classified into four groups, which we label ‘mean-reverting’, ‘Brownian motion real-option’, ‘Brownian motion myopic real-option’, and ‘ambiguous’. We find two behavioral biases in the strategies of our participants: ignoring the mean-reverting process, and myopic behavior. Both lead to too frequent switches when compared with the theoretical benchmark. We also find that the last group behaved as if they have learned to incorporate the true underlying process into their decisions, and improved their decisions during the later stage.     

Does Sentiment Explain Closed-end Fund Discounts? Evidence from Bond Funds

This paper documents that discounts and premia on closed-end bond funds exhibit the same sensitivity to broad market returns as stock fund discounts. Despite this, stock funds sell on average at discounts from net asset value while bond funds sell at small premia. This pattern calls into question the conclusion that the average level of the discount rate can be rationalized by appealing to the systematic nature of discount risk. These results indicate that appeals to investor sentiment, which have been hypothesized as a source of fund discounts, do not fully resolve the puzzle of closed-end fund discounts.