Are Auditors Compromised by Nonaudit Services? Assessing the Evidence*

Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006) use an earnings conservatism framework to investigate the effects of nonaudit services (NAS) on earnings conservatism, and to test whether audit quality was impaired by NAS in Australia during the 1990s. They find no evidence of differential conservatism conditional on the level of NAS fees paid to auditors, and thus conclude that NAS have no adverse effect on audit quality. While this result may not extrapolate to the U.S. setting due to institutional difference between the two countries, the study does add to a growing body of empirical evidence that questions whether there is any logical rationale for restricting the scope of the services that auditors provide to their audit clients. In reviewing the NAS research literature over the past 40 years, one has to conclude that there is no “smoking gun” evidence linking the provision of nonaudit services with audit failures. However, the literature also finds that NAS can adversely affect the appearance of auditor independence, and this may be more than a “mere perception” problem, because there is also evidence that stock prices are significantly lower for companies that pay their auditors large fees for nonaudit services.     

Portfolio analysis of asset and liability management in small-, medium- and large-sized banks

The paper presents an analysis of the commercial banking firm based on Markowitz portfolio analysis. A bank is treated as a portfolio of five banking assets and three banking liabilities. The average rate of return and risk of each asset and liability is estimated empirically for groups of banks categorized by size — small, medium and large. Banks' rates return on equity are defined as the weighted average of the assets' rates of return less the liabilities' rates of return. Quadratic programming is used to delineate the set of banking portfolios which have the maximum rate of return on equity at each level of risk.     

What are the real prospects for total EC integration?

Nothing can stop the momentum behind the movement for total European integration, or so it would seem. But what about the impact of Gemn reunijication, strong nationalistic feelings, and the socialist tradition in Europe? The authors look at what impact these might have on the move toward creation of a Single Market.     

Technology transactions: networks over markets

There is a widespread belief in the business community that firms can rely on the market for buying and selling technological opportunities. The argument is: with so much technology development going on in the world, ‘there must be somebody somewhere who has the technology we need.’ According to this belief, acquiring new technology just boils down to finding the supplier, possibly with the help of a specialized intermediary. Several large firms have indeed developed ambitious mechanisms for acquiring the needed technological know-how as they proceed to make and market a new product. We contend that this concept of the technology transfer process is erroneous, as it conflicts with actual practice. The very high transaction costs entailed leave considerable room for opportunistic behavior and are more likely to occur when the parties do not know each other. An effective way to reduce transaction costs, therefore, is to limit technology transfers to the firm's partners, i.e. organizations with which the firm has already interacted in the past. Our research provides evidence that successful technology transfers typically take place between suppliers and buyers who had business relationships before considering a technology agreement. In addition, we report findings that companies using intermediaries (technological opportunities catalogues, databases, fairs, etc.) have been disappointed in their attempts to find new technologies from unknown sources. Because of the high risk of opportunistic behavior, it is practically impossible to assess the value of a technology without knowing who sells it. Similarly, the technology transfer capabilities of a company are difficult to appraise without prior knowledge through business interaction. To a certain extent, it may be better to buy any technology from a partner that one knows well than to buy a supposedly good technology from a firm with which one has had no experience. To put it bluntly: the identity of the partner may actually matter more than the technology being traded! Consequently, the relevant framework for technology transfer is built on a ‘network concept’ rather than the ‘market concept’. Firms wishing to acquire new technology should turn first to their network of trusted business partners, looking for available technological opportunities instead of trying to buy technology from unrelated organizations.     

The Volatility and Transmission of Equity Returns among the G-7 Countries: the post-Bretton Woods experience

This paper models the volatility of national stock market returns of the G-7 countries using ARCH and GARCH modeling techniques. Then, via the use of vector autoregression analysis, the international transmission of volatility among the countries is explored for the period between April 1973 and July 1990. Variance decompositions are calculated in order to quantify the impacts of volatility shocks in one market on the others. Impulse response functions are used to inspect the dynamic responses of domestic and foreign volatility shocks. Results indicate that volatility transmission among the G-7 countries is the norm in the post-Bretton Woods era. Further, we find that volatility shocks are generally absorbed within six to nine months.     

The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian Market

The effect of audit firm size on prizes is a complex function of competition in the market for audit services, product differentiation, and scale economics to large firms. In this study, a competitive market is supported in Australia with product differentiation to Bif Eight accounting firms. Specially, Big Eight accounting firms have significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. This results holds for ‘large’ and ‘small’ auditees. A test is also made of price cutting in the Australian market. Price cutting is defined as lower initial audit fees than continuing engagement fees for a comparable audit. Test results do not evidence price-cutting behavior by accounting firms. There is in fact weak evidence that initial audit fees are higher than continuing engagement fee levels. Higher initial fees suggest that accounting firms may recover at least some of the audit start-up costs immediately.