Gains From Trade in a Cournot–Nash General Equilibrium

It is shown that, in a context of Cournot–Nash general equilibrium, free trade is potentially gainful for each trading country. No restrictions are placed on the numbers of products, factors of production or countries, or on the nature of returns to scale. Moreover, preferences, techniques and factor endowments can differ from agent to agent.
JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F12, F13, F15.     

Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.     

Advances on Stackelberg open-loop and feedback strategies

In this paper, we study a familiar type of dynamic games called "common-property resource games" to establish the following results. First, the Stackelberg equilibrium may not exist in some cases, with open-loop strategies as well as with feedback strategies. Second, an explicit example is given to show that under feedback strategies, the best linear strategy on the part of the leader is inferior to a nonlinear strategy so that it is dangerous to confine our search to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the space of linear functions. Most importantly, we establish an "Implementation Lemma", which allows us to develop one methodology to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium with feedback strategies when the equilibrium is assumed to exist.     

The industry origins of Japanese economic growth

This paper presents new data on the sources of growth for the Japanese economy over the period 1960–2000. The principal innovation is the incorporation of detailed information for individual industries, including those involved in the production of computers, communications equipment, and electronic components as information technology equipment. We show that economic growth is dominated by investments and productivity growth in information technology, both for individual industries and the economy as a whole. We also show that the revival of total factor productivity growth accounts for the modest resurgence of the Japanese economy since 1995. J. Japanese Int. Economies 19 (4) (2005) 482–542.     

Recent Challenges to the Classical Gains–from–Trade Proposition

The classical gains–from–trade conjecture was finally given a thorough Arrow–Debreu proof in 1972. Since then, the proposition has been repeatedly challenged. Some of the challenges rest on grounds which in no respect violate Arrow–Debreu assumptions. Those challenges are therefore without foundation. The remaining challenges rest on the assertion that some of the Arrow–Debreu assumptions are unnatural and unnecessarily restrictive or on the imposition of artificial restrictions on the set of permissible compensatory transfers. We conclude that none of the challenges can be sustained.     

On Chamberlinian-Ricardian Trade Patterns

This study provides a simple, many‐industry model of trade which emphasizes the interaction between cross‐country technical heterogeneity (i.e., a Ricardian aspect) and monopolistic competition among producers of differentiated products (i.e., a Chamberlinian aspect) as determinants of trade patterns. It is shown that the emergence of intra‐industry trade is crucially dependent on the shape of the technology index schedule, which is obtained as a step‐function.     

Comparative statics for profit-maximizing and labor-managed cournot oligopolies

Comparative static results are derived for two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing and labor-managed Cournot oligopolies. After establishing a general principle for comparative statics for oligopoly, we will examine how a shift in the demand function, changes in the wage rate, indirect tax rates and fixed costs, and technical change affect the equilibrium Cournot industry and firms‘ outputs, firms’ profits and dividends per unit of labor. We will also analyze the effects of entry. Our analysis makes an extensive use of the relationship existing between an individual firm's and industry outputs. We will derive two kinds of stability conditions: one behavioristic and the other computational. Finally, we will conduct comparative static analysis for mixed oligopoly where several profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms co-exist.     

A capital accumulation model of the workers' enterprise

This article formulates a capital accumulation model of the workers' enterprise in which the standard adjustment-costs theory of investment is introduced into Sertel's framework. The existence, uniqueness and local stability of the steady state are shown to be established under mild conditions and the long-run effects of changes in the price of output, the external wage rate and the interest rate on the volume of capital and the size of membership are examined.     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.