An stated preference analysis of Spanish freight forwarders modal choice on the south-west Europe Motorway of the Sea

This paper aims to contribute towards the design of effective freight transport policy by means of empirical analysis. In order to do so, a stated preference survey is undertaken to model the modal choice between door-to-door road transport and short sea shipping in the Motorway of the Sea of south-west Europe. The proposed analysis will provide policymakers with the necessary tool to identify the critical areas that should be addressed by future policy action in order to boost short sea shipping on Spain's Mediterranean coast. By applying the proposed method, we will be able to obtain estimates of the subjective values of transport attributes – value of time, value of reliability and value of frequency – in freight transport, values for which barely any empirical evidence on a national scale exists. Quantifying such values is a key part of the cost benefit analyses performed when evaluating transport projects.     

Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina’s long-run decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.     

On the economic theory of the labor-managed firm in the short run

This paper proposes a short-run utility-maximizing theory of the labor-managed firm (LMF), and shows how four previous theories can be derived from it. It is argued that one of the models, by Horvat, should be viewed as a type of satisficing theory for the LMF. In contrast to the theory of the conventional capitalist firm, it is the satisficing variant that provides efficient resource allocation. This paper also shows why comparative-static analysis may not be as accurate a predictor of short-run behavior of the LMF as it is for the profit-maximizing firm. Consideration is given to microeconomic policy in a socialist labor-managed economy.     

Relevance of trade facilitation in emerging countries' exports

The objective of this article is to analyse trade flows in emerging nations with a maritime boundary, where trade facilitation plays a decisive role in their international development. In order to detect possible patterns in performance, we apply the economic approach of gravity models using the World Bank Logistic Performance Index (LPI) as a good proxy of trade facilitation. The results of the estimation lead to the conclusion that the more complex the transportation of goods is, the more influential the logistics indicator, trade facilitation being most prominent in Middle East exporters.     

Second-order ambiguous beliefs

This paper axiomatizes models of second-order ambiguous beliefs in the original domain of preferences of Anscombe and Aumann (Ann Math Stat 34:199–205, 1963) by weakening the first-stage independence postulate. The models we propose include the second-order subjective expected utility (SOSEU) of Seo (Econometrica 77:1575–1605, 2009) as a particular case. We characterize the intersection of our models of second-order ambiguity with the canonical models of (first-order) ambiguity aversion and provide a further generalization of SOSEU by relaxing the completeness axiom.     

Mixed Equilibrium,Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: An Experimental Study

We experimentally study three aspects of $2\times 2$ one-shot games with collaboratively dominant strategies: if subjects play according to the mixed Nash equilibrium; if the collaborative equilibrium has a focal point property; and if the burning money mechanism stimulates a collaborative behavior. First, our results show that players do not seem to play according to the mixed Nash equilibrium and that the collaborative equilibrium does not seem to have focal point properties. In fact, the subjects seem to prefer less risky strategies when compared to efficient ones. Our results also show that a burning money mechanism only helps players to collaborate when it transforms a collaborative profile of strategies into a collaborative equilibrium. This fact is justified because other burning money mechanisms will only help collaboration if the subjects were playing according to de mixed Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, even when burning money mechanisms improved the collaboration rate, such rate’s increase was smaller than the expected by the mixed Nash equilibrium.