Countervailing Power and Price Transparency*

We investigate whether improved transparency about prices may increase the countervailing power exercised by buyers of an intermediate good. In a model with an informed manufacturer that sells to both informed and uninformed firms, we show that full transparency cannot be part of equilibrium due to the strategic effect of the resulting informational spillover. Transparency policies introduce a distortion for informed segments and are unsuccessful in completely removing the distortion from the uninformed segment. Welfare effects are hence ambiguous and depend on the weight assigned to uninformed markets. Our results thus cast further doubt on the value of transparency.     

Lobbying Bureaucrats*

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

The effects of removing the Trondheim toll cordon

This article presents the effects of removing the Trondheim toll cordon, which was closed after nearly 15 years of operation on December 31, 2005. The traffic levels, measured as vehicles per hour, in 2006 are compared to traffic levels in 2005. The evaluation also covers the effect on the retail market and possible environmental effects. We also seek to investigate what the traffic levels would have been today if the cordon had still been in operation. We find that the closing of the Trondheim toll cordon has lead to increased traffic levels in the peak hours, with an average increase of 11.3% in the former charging hours of 06:00–18:00. On an average, the hours between 14:00 and 18:00 experienced an increase in traffic of 15.5%, whilst traffic in the evenings and nights decreased. Model results suggest that the removal of the toll cordon has caused the private car to increase its modal share at the expense of passengers per car, public transport and cycling/walking. The increase in the total number of trips would have been more uniformly distributed among the alternatives if the toll cordon had still been in operation.     

Local niche planning and its strategic implications for implementation of energy-efficient technology

It is widely recognised that the world is facing climate challenges that necessitate transitions towards more energy-efficient buildings. A key challenge is that visions of energy efficient buildings in policies often fail to become aligned with existing local practices. In order to overcome such a gap between policy visions and their implementation in practice specific forms of strategic work is needed, according to new transformative ideas in spatial planning. The aim of this paper is to characterize the transformative capacities of this kind of strategic work at the spatial scale of the town in order to assess how such activities engage with sustainable transitions. The theoretical contribution of the paper is to compare strategic work performed in transformative forms of spatial planning with the strategic work intended in strategic niche management, which represent a change-management process for enabling transitions. The study outlines the proactive spatial planning of a Danish local authority in order to illustrate how the strategic work performed in this kind of local development project represents a special form of niche management that is able to create room for innovation and challenge existing socio-technical regimes in the building sector, but still different to typical strategic niche management processes. Based on this empirical study, the paper challenges the narrow focus on niches around technology development processes in strategic niche management by pointing towards niche planning in local development projects as another relevant context for niche management. However, as discussed in the paper, this assumes a more strategic form of planning than is often practised today, where more emphasis is put on how planning can contribute to promoting sustainable transitions.     

Labor Market Dynamics and the Business Cycle: Structural Evidence for the United States*

We use a 12‐dimensional VAR to examine the aggregate effects of two structural technology shocks and two policy shocks. For each shock, we examine the dynamic effects on the labor market, the importance of the shock for labor market volatility, and the comovement between labor market variables and other key aggregate variables in response to the shock. We document that labor market indicators display “hump‐shaped” responses to the identified shocks. Technology shocks and monetary policy shocks are important for labor market volatility but the ranking of their importance is sensitive to the VAR specification. The conditional correlations at business cycle frequencies are similar in response to the four shocks, apart from the correlations between hours worked, labor productivity and real wages. To account for the unconditional correlations between these variables, a mixture of shocks is required.     

The Political Economy of Agricultural Statistics and Input Subsidies: Evidence from India,Nigeria and Malawi

The political economy of agricultural policies – why certain interventions may be preferred by political leaders rather than others – is well recognized. This paper explores a perspective that has previously been neglected: the political economy of the agricultural statistics. In developing economies, the data on agricultural production are weak. Because these data are assembled using competing methods and assumptions, the final series are subject to political pressure, particularly when the government is subsidizing agricultural inputs. This paper draws on debates on the evidence of a Green Revolution in India and the arguments on the effect of withdrawing fertilizer subsidies during structural adjustment in Nigeria, and finally the paper presents new data on the effect of crop data subsidies in Malawi. The recent agricultural census (2006/7) indicates a maize output of 2.1 million metric tonnes, compared to the previously widely circulated figures of 3.4 million metric tonnes. The paper suggests that ‘data’ are themselves a product of agricultural policies.     

Identifying and Acting on Early Warning Signs in Complex Projects

We consider identification of early warning signs (EWS) in projects. Project professionals are not good at detecting or acting on EWS. Barriers that lead to this are identified. The nature of EWS and their detection change with the evolving situation. Project assessments, typically part of gateways, are useful in identifying EWS connected to the formalities of the project. As complexity increases, assessments have more limited use, and the project is increasingly dependent on detecting EWS by informal “gut feeling.” Thus, knowledge, experience, and communication skills are increasingly important in complex situations. We conclude with a list of early warning signs.