THE FORMATION OF CONSUMER INFLATION EXPECTATIONS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN'S DEFLATION EXPERIENCE

Using a new data set, we investigate the relationship between the inflation experience and expectations of households in Japan, focusing on the post-1995 deflationary era. Our first finding is that inflation expectations increase with age. Second, we find that measured inflation rates also increase with age, although age and inflation expectations continue to exhibit a positive correlation even after controlling for the household-level inflation rate. Analysis suggests that the correlation between age and inflation expectations is driven largely by the correlation between cohort and inflation expectations, which we interpret to represent the effect of historical inflation experience on inflation expectations.     

Does a large loss of bank capital cause Evergreening? Evidence from Japan

Using the real estate lending share of the bank’s loan portfolio at the peak of the land-price bubble as an instrument for bank capital, we identify the impact of capital adequacy on the allocation of bank lending under the Basel regulatory framework. We find that, in Japan, a large loss of bank capital caused by the regulator’s excessively tough stance towards banks not only induced the contraction of the bank lending supply but also the banks’ reallocation of their lending portfolios to financially unhealthy industries with a higher concentration of non-performing loans.     

Random walk or a run. Market microstructure analysis of foreign exchange rate movements based on conditional probability

Using tick-by-tick data for the dollar–yen and euro–dollar exchange rates recorded on the actual transaction platform, a ‘run’—continuous increases or decreases in deal prices for the past several ticks—does have some predictable information on the direction of the next price movement. Deal price movements, that are consistent with order flows, tend to continue a run once it is started. Indeed, conditional probabilities of a run continuing in the same direction after several consecutive observations exceed 0.5. However, quote prices do not show such a run tendency. Hence, a random walk hypothesis is refuted in a simple test of a run using tick-by-tick data. In addition, a longer continuous increase of the price tends to be followed by a larger reversal. The findings suggest that those market participants who have access to real-time, tick-by-tick transaction data may have an advantage in predicting exchange rate movements. The findings reported here also lend support to the momentum trading strategy.     

Free trade networks

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries.     

LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY*

This article presents a microfounded model of money with a consumption and an investment market. We consider an economy in which only part of the investment returns can be pledged. A liquidity constraint arises when the pledgeable part of the returns are not enough to pay for investment costs. We show that when the liquidity constraint is binding, agents may make a cash downpayment and money can perform two roles—as a provider of liquidity services and exchange services. The liquidity constraint constitutes a channel though which underinvestment occurs even at low inflation rates.     

The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003.     

Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries

The striking result has been shown by Richardson that tariff revenue competition between two symmetric member countries of a free trade area (FTA) results in complete elimination of external tariffs if there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium at all. Richardson also conjectures without building a model that if member countries are asymmetric in market size, there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in which both countries set positive external tariffs. We explicitly extend his tariff competition model into the case of asymmetric FTA member countries, and confirm his conjecture. We also show that there exists a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric countries.     

Dynamic Free Trade Networks: Some Numerical Results

To help predict whether the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) continues until global free trade is effectively attained, this paper investigates dynamic paths of FTAs, generated by numerical simulations of a model of an FTA network formation game with many countries. The characteristics of the final FTA network naturally depend on how the proposer of an FTA is chosen in each period. The paper finds that if the country that has the largest incentive to form an FTA is chosen as a proposer in each period, the network evolution always leads to a unique final FTA network, which may or may not be the complete network of FTAs. FTA networks often evolve to a partition of the world into a small number of groups of asymmetric size owing to the negative network externality caused by preference erosion.