Consumer Attitude towards Organic Labeling Schemes in Japan

ABSTRACT

Japan is the most lucrative organic market in the Asian region and is projected to account for about 80% of the Asian market revenues by 2009 (Kuhlmann and Jones, 2006). This study identifies Japanese consumer preference and interest in two major labeling information- source of organic certification/traceability and country of origin for organic food products. Stated preference method (SPM) based survey data was collected from two major cities in Japan in order to develop Japanese consumers' organic food choice model. Findings show that Japanese consumers are willing to pay 10% price premium for the organic food products compared to conventional products that have no specific labeling, suggesting a significant profit margin to be possibly captured by the organic producers and marketers. The Japanese consumers have perceived value of the JAS label in their stated preference and showed willingness to pay a price premium for this quality certification system, which validates the importance of government-regulated mandatory labeling. Regarding the country origin labeling issue, the Japanese consumers showed clear preference for the domestic organic products to the imported products, while showing no preference for any particular country origin for imported organic products. For private-voluntary organic labeling, the consumer organization-led organic label is considered to be more reliable source than the retailer-guaranteed organic label.     

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

The best known achievement of the literature on resource-allocating mechanisms and their message spaces is the first rigorous proof of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. In an exchange economy withN persons andK+1 commodities (including a numeraire), that mechanism announcesK prices as well as aK-compenent trade vector for each ofN−1 persons, making a total ofNK message variables. Trial messages are successively announced and after each announcement each personprivately determines, usingprivate information, whether she finds the proposed trades acceptable at the announced prices. When a message is reached with which all are content, then the trades specified in that message take place, and they satisfy Pareto optimality and individual rationality. The literature shows that no (suitably regular) mechanism can achieve the same thing with fewer thanNK message variables. In the classic proof, all the candidate mechanisms have the privacy property, and the proof uses that property in a crucial way. ‘Non-private’ mechanisms are, however, well-defined. We present a proof that forN>K,NK remains a lower bound even when we permit ‘non-private’ mechanisms. Our new proof does not use privacy at all. But in a non-private mechanism, minimality of the number of message variables can hardly be defended as the hallmark of informational efficiency, since a non-private mechanism requires some persons to know something about the private information of othersin addition to the information contained in the messages. The new proof of the lower boundNK invites a new interpretation of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. We provide a new concept of efficiency which the competitive mechanism exhibits and which does rest on privacy even whenN>K. To do so, we first define a class ofprojection mechanisms, wherein some of the message variables are proposed values of the action to be taken, and the rest are auxiliary variables. The competitive mechanism has the projection property, with a trade vector as its action and prices as the auxiliary variables. A projection mechanism proposes an action; for each proposal, the agents then use the auxiliary variables, together with their private information, to verify that the proposed action meets the mechanism's goal (Pareto optimality and individual rationality for the competitive mechanism) if, indeed, it does meet that goal. For a given goal, we seek projection mechanisms for which theverification effort (suitably measured) is not greater than that of any other projection mechanism that achieves the goal. We show the competitive mechanism to be verification-minimal within the class of private projection mechanisms that achieve Pareto optimality and individual rationality; that proofdoes use the privacy of the candidate mechanisms. We also show, under certain conditions, that a verification-minimal projection mechanism achieving a given goal has smallest ‘total communication effort’ (which is locally equivalent to the classic ‘message-space size’) among all private mechanisms that achieve the goal, whether or not they have the projection property.     

New office technology and the labour process in contemporary Japanese banking

Japanese banks account for the top nine of the world's ten biggest banks. Rationalization has led to increased control of employees in the sphere of labour management. This article examines labour management and working conditions in relation to the introduction of new office technology.     

Regret aversion and opportunity dependence

This paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision maker is driven by anticipated ex post regrets. Our model allows both regret aversion and likelihood judgement over states to coexist. Also, we characterize two special cases, minimax regret with multiple priors that generalizes Savage's minimax regret, and a smooth model of regret aversion.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

The Perceptual Gaps Between Companies’ and University Students’ Views on Fundamental Competencies

This study examines the gap between the competencies that companies expect of university students and those that university students believe companies are seeking. We find that a gap exists between companies’ and students’ evaluations of the competencies required in the workplace. Surprisingly, companies’ and students’ priorities related to competencies are different. Our results show that both companies and students highly value versatile personal competencies as essential skills for employees. Teamwork skills are not a top priority for companies although students value them highest of the various attributes. Gaps also exist between the two groups regarding their evaluation of personality traits. These findings contribute to the development of appropriate curricula for universities and career education.     

Neighbors follow early adopters under stress: panel data analysis of submergence‐tolerant rice in northern Bangladesh

The benefits of a stress‐tolerant crop become visible under the stresses that the crop is tolerant against. We investigate the adoption of submergence‐tolerant rice in northern Bangladesh by using panel data of 461 households, interviewed in 2013 and 2015. The sample households were randomly selected in 31 villages where submergence‐tolerant rice seeds were given to a small number of farmers in each village. The results from the household fixed‐effects model indicate that submergence in the previous year increased the adoption of submergence‐tolerant rice. The adoption impact was larger among farmers who were neighbors of early seed recipients. Our results suggest that being neighbors of early seed recipients may have helped the neighboring farmers observe the benefits of the submergence‐tolerant rice under submergence. The results indicate the importance of the information flow from early recipients to neighboring farmers.     

Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited

This paper proposes the use of Bayesian potential games as models of informationally decentralized organizations. Applying techniques in team decision problems by Radner (1962) , this paper characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of Bayesian potentials and demonstrates using examples that Bayesian potentials are useful tools for studying the efficient use of information in organizations.     

The impact of retirement on household consumption in Japan

Using monthly data from the Japanese Family Income and Expenditure Survey, we examine the impact of retirement on household consumption. We find little evidence of an immediate change in consumption at retirement, on average, in Japan. However, we find a decrease in consumption at retirement for low income households that is concentrated in food and work-related consumption. The availability of substantial retirement bonuses to a large share of Japanese retirees may help smooth consumption at retirement. We find that those households that are more likely to receive such bonuses experience a short-run consumption increase at retirement. However, among households that are less likely to receive a retirement bonus, we find that consumption decreases at retirement.