Inflation-unemployment tradeoff and regional labor market data

We estimate a linear and a piecewise linear Phillips curve model with regional labor market data for West German and Neue L?nder. Employing regional observations allows us to country difference the data. This eliminates, under the assumption of homogeneous L?nder, supply shocks and changes in the formation of expectations as possible identification failures. With seemingly unrelated regressions we find a flat Phillips curve in the Neue L?nder. For the West German L?nder a piecewise linear model with a higher inflation-unemployment tradeoff for the regime of low unemployment rates fits the data very well. The results hold true if we control for endogeneity of the unemployment rate. With a kinked but upward sloping aggregate supply curve there seems to be room for stabilization policies, at least in the range of aggregate demand shifts that our data covers. First version received: December 2000/Final version accepted: Jan. 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  An earlier version of this paper was written while the second author was at Universidad Carlos III in Madrid. He thanks Juan Dolado and is grateful for financial support by the TMR Program on New Approaches for the Study of Economic Fluctuations. He would also like to thank Bertrand Koebel for his critique on that earlier version. Both authors are grateful to an editor and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Moreover, we wish to thank participants of the seminar on Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung by Jürgen Wolters and Peter Kuhbier, Freie Universit?t Berlin. Finally we profited from discussions with participants at the conferences of the European Economic Association in Lausanne and the Verein für Socialpolitik in Magdeburg where the paper was presented. Of course, all errors are to our sole responsibility.     

A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal–Agent Theory

Why are principal–agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal–agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input‐ and output‐related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed.     

Did Partial Globalization Increase Inequality? The Case of the Latin American Periphery, 1950-2000

Inequality is an important threat to the globalization of theworld economy that we experience today. This contribution usesthe coefficient of height variation as a measure of inequality.This indicator covers not only wage recipients, but also theselfemployed, the unemployed, housewives, children, and othergroups who may not participate in a market economy, for theperiod 1950–79, for which income inequality data is mostlyunavailable or inconsistent. It turns out that within-countryinequality is higher in time periods of greater openness. Thisresult is confirmed for the time period 1950–2000, anda much broader model. (JEL I12, I32, N33)     

Incentives and Selection in Promotion Contests: Is It Possible to Kill Two Birds with One Stone?

This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one‐stage) and dynamic (two‐stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A structural change that improves the performance in one dimension leads to a deterioration in the other dimension. This suggests that modifications of the contest structure are an alternative to strategic handicaps. A key advantage of structural handicaps over participant‐specific ones is that the implementation of the former does not require prior identification of worker types. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

European agri-environmental policy for the 21st century

The present paper reviews the development of agri-environmental policy in Europe and assesses its prospects. While it does so from a predominantly UK perspective, there are many common features of the experience and policy choices across the majority of Member States. The first generation of agri-environmental measures applied command-and-control regulation for the prevention of pollution. Second-generation measures pay farmers for providing environmental public goods. The emphasis on 'amenity' derived from the maintenance of agricultural production systems contrasts with policy approaches in Australia and the USA. Well-designed incentive schemes constitute 'quasi-markets' for public goods, correcting for a pre-existing market failure. Problems in the delivery of policy include poor spatial targeting and a lack of clarity between environmental and income support objectives. Various changes will be required in order to increase the environmental effectiveness and efficiency of agri-environmental mechanisms.     

Financing Decisions along a Firm’s Life‐cycle: Debt as a Commitment Device

We analyse the life‐cycle patterns of a firm’s financing decisions and their interaction with future growth and development decisions. We derive different financing sequences which we link to existing empirical research as well as derive new testable hypotheses regarding differences in firms’ financing decisions to project, firm, market and country characteristics. We provide a rationale for the importance of (external) start‐up debt financing as observed in recent empirical studies. Furthermore, we argue that equity financing at both development stages is more likely for closely‐held firms and in countries in which entrepreneurs face high stigmatisation costs.     

Organic or conventional? Optimal dairy farming technology under the EU milk quota system and organic subsidies

This paper assesses the competitiveness of organic and conventional dairy farms under different milk market and organic farming policy scenarios. We use a DEA-based model to estimate for each policy scenario the sample farms’ profit potential in both technologies. The model enables identification of a farm’s optimal technology based on its input–output observations. The empirical analysis is based on the annual accounts of 1300 Bavarian dairy farms. Results indicate that approximately 69% (78%) of the organic (conventional) farms have chosen their optimal farming system. The remaining organic (conventional) farmers could increase their profit on average by roughly 6% (10%) by switching to the other technology. Abolishment of the EU milk quota results in a considerable decline in the number of sample farms for which organic farming is the optimal technology, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, organic dairy farms may lose competitive advantage with the deregulation of the EU’s milk market regime in 2015. Organic maintenance payments more than double the number of farms with a higher earning potential in organic farming, but their effectiveness could decline when the milk quota is abolished.