Investor protection,regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.     

How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.     

Threshold effect of economic openness on bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging markets

This paper investigates the non-linear effects of two aspects of economic openness, namely, trade openness and financial openness, on banking system stability. We use a panel of 42 emerging markets from 2000 to 2014 to test whether bank risk-taking behaviour varies with the level of openness. We find that a higher degree of trade openness promotes bank stability linearly. Conversely, the non-linear effect of financial openness on bank risk-taking is evident. When the financial system is not sufficiently open, the impact of financial openness on bank stability is insignificant. However, as the domestic financial market becomes more open, financial openness can help discipline the behaviour of banks, making them more stable. We also find evidence that these effects are transmitted through the market discipline channel. Our findings highlight the importance of strengthening the domestic regulatory framework and transparency as the economy becomes more integrated.     

Bank business models and liquidity creation

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, this study investigates the association between functional diversification and bank liquidity creation. I document evidence of lower liquidity creation for higher diversification. The effect of moving into nontraditional activities on liquidity creation is more apparent with large banks and less pronounced with small banks. The impact of diversification on liquidity creation is less significant during the late stage of crisis and is more clearly observed in small and medium-sized banks. Low liquidity creation banks, leveraged by a higher share of non-interest income, are more likely to further decrease their liquidity creation. The study is of interest to regulators and policymakers who are concerned about bank business models.     

中国邮储银行大连分行网点转型下客户服务模式创新研究

随着社会大众对金融服务的要求不断增多,银行网点转型已经成为一个必然趋势。信息时代背景下,银行网点的转型大多向智能化的方向转变,而随着网点转型,其客户服务模式也在不断创新。论文以邮储银行大连分行为例,对银行网点智能化转型的影响进行了分析,探究了邮储银行大连分行网点智能化转型存在的问题,并且提出了相关的转型建议,最后对邮储银行大连分行智能化网点转型下客户服务模式的创新情况进行了研究,希望能够在银行网点智能化转型的背景下,促进其客户服务水平的不断提升。     

Independence in bank governance structure: Empirical evidence of effects on bank risk and performance

We investigate how different governance arrangements affect risk and return in banks. Using a new data set for UK banks over the period 2003–2012, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to control for the reciprocal relationship between risk and return. We show that separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman increases bank risk without causing a concurrent increase in return. We also find that oversight by a Remuneration Committee and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) lowers the probability of bank failure, indicating that empowering an independent Chairman has different effects from empowering independent NEDs. Overall, our results underline the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements within banks.     

News-driven international credit cycles

How does news about future economic fundamentals affect within-country and cross-country credit allocation? How effective is unconventional policy when financial crises are driven by unfulfilled favorable news? I study these questions by employing a two-sector, two-country macroeconomic model with a banking sector in which financial crises are associated with occasionally binding leverage constraints. In response to positive news on the valuation of non-traded sector capital which turns out to be incorrect at a later date, the model captures the patterns of financial flows and current account dynamics in Spain between 2000–2010, including the changes in the sectoral allocation of bank credit and movements in cross-country borrowing during the boom and the bust. When there are unconventional policies by a common authority in response to unfulfilled favorable news, liquidity injections perform better in ameliorating the downturn than direct assets purchases from the non-traded sector.     

Government support and bank performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Though previous studies suggest a state participation has a negative impact on banks, this paper highlights the potential benefits of state ownership for confidence and stability in the post-crisis period that can outweigh the inefficiencies and potential for corruption of political intervention. We find that the state guarantees are valuable during the crisis. The negative (positive) relation between state ownership and bank profitability (risk) is mitigated in the post-crisis period. Financially troubled banks that receive a transfer payment or capital injection experience improved performance during the post-bailout period.     

Guarantees,transparency and the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk

Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency.