Employment with connections: Negative network effects

In less developed countries, it is widely observed that employers hire workers through employee referrals. In this paper, we show an extension of this kind of networks that may decrease applicants' payoffs while a diversification of the networks can raise referred applicants' payoffs. We also discuss the effect of the extension of interlinked contracts on farmers' wages.     

Practical Problems with Reduced‐rank ML Estimators for Cointegration Parameters and a Simple Alternative*

Johansen's reduced‐rank maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for cointegration parameters in vector error correction models is known to produce occasional extreme outliers. Using a small monetary system and German data we illustrate the practical importance of this problem. We also consider an alternative generalized least squares (GLS) system estimator which has better properties in this respect. The two estimators are compared in a small simulation study. It is found that the GLS estimator can indeed be an attractive alternative to ML estimation of cointegration parameters.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Bootstrap testing for the null of no cointegration in a threshold vector error correction model

We develop a test for the linear no cointegration null hypothesis in a threshold vector error correction model. We adopt a sup-Wald type test and derive its null asymptotic distribution. A residual-based bootstrap is proposed, and the first-order consistency of the bootstrap is established. A set of Monte Carlo simulations shows that the bootstrap corrects size distortion of asymptotic distribution in finite samples, and that its power against the threshold cointegration alternative is significantly greater than that of conventional cointegration tests. Our method is illustrated with used car price indexes.     

Identification and estimation in sequential,asymmetric, English auctions

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. When the identity of the winner and the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and propose a semi-nonparametric estimation strategy based on orthogonal polynomials. We apply our estimator to daily data from fish auctions in Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.     

Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model*

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation.     

Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price-bundle pair of his choice. We identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules. We then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n-object case. We use these results to characterize environments, mainly distributions of valuations, where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases.     

Maximum Eigenvalue Test for Seasonal Cointegrating Ranks*

The maximum eigenvalue (ME) test for seasonal cointegrating ranks is presented using the approach of Cubadda [Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (2001), Vol. 63, pp. 497–511], which is computationally more efficient than that of Johansen and Schaumburg [Journal of Econometrics (1999), Vol. 88, pp. 301–339]. The asymptotic distributions of the ME test statistics are obtained for several cases that depend on the nature of deterministic terms. Monte Carlo experiments are conducted to evaluate the relative performances of the proposed ME test and the trace test, and we illustrate these tests using a monthly time series.     

Pitfalls in the estimation of a cost function that ignores allocative inefficiency: A Monte Carlo analysis

In the stochastic frontier literature, it is a widely held view that allocative inefficiency can be lumped together with technical inefficiency in the estimation of cost frontiers. Therefore, a one-sided error term in the cost function is believed to capture the cost of overall (technical plus allocative) inefficiency. In this paper we challenge that view through a detailed Monte Carlo investigation. The results show that failure to include the cost of allocative inefficiency explicitly in the cost function biases the estimates of: (i) the cost function parameters, (ii) returns to scale, (iii) input price elasticities, and (iv) cost-inefficiency.