上市公司股权激励问题研究

以现代企业理论和人力资本理论为基础的股权激励,有助于完善公司治理结构.文章论述了股权激励的理论基础、在我国发展情况以及推行的难点问题.结合目前我国股权分置改革,设计了股权激励的业绩评价指标和内在价值体现指标,提出了利用业绩和内在价值体现两个指标对激励对象进行综合评价的观点.     

论新形势下收入分配中"效率与公平"关系

“效率与公平”是收入分配中一对永恒的矛盾。应当根据不同时期经济社会发展的形势采取不同的指导方针,作者根据当今社会经济发展的新形势,提出了调整收入分配上的“效率优先”原则,改行效率与公平并重,实现效率与公平的统一。     

美国GE公司CEO继任规划的启示

继任规划在企业追求长期战略和持久业绩的过程中起着关键作用。而CEO继任规划则是企业最重大的战略决策。美国GE公司由于建立了一套行之有效的CEO继任规划程序，从而保证企业能够培养合适的CEO候选人。公司CEO继任规划包括内部接班继任、内部竞争继任、突然政变继任和广泛选择继任等4种方式。每一种继任方式都有其优势和劣势。不存在适用于所有公司的继任方式。不同的公司如何选择适合的继任方式取决于公司本身的条件。目前，我国企业正在进入经营者大换班高峰期，可以借鉴美国GE公司CEO继任规划的成功经验，进一步完善继任机制。     

会计信息披露的产权结构研究

本文对会计信息披露的产权结构进行了分析,发现会计信息披露实质是由信息支配权所有者向信息要求权所有者提供会计信息的过程.会计信息要求权的形成是与企业性质分不开的,而会计信息支配权的形成则取决于信息披露过程中的交易费用是否最小化.     

司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析

司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法.     

环境危机--一个现实问题的实质探究

日趋严重的环境问题已成了制约我国经济、社会可持续发展的极大障碍，要实现全面建设小康社会的目标，就必须正视环境危机，探询问题的实质，以便寻找到解决问题的良策。     

Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

Seasoned Equity Issues in a Closely Held Market: Evidence from France

This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France.Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly usingthe relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcementof seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly negative forpublic offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse selection effect is greater for rights issues thanfor public offerings, due to stronger underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that theshare price effect is positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with priorconcentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the adverse selection effect.