Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

Minimum wages and non-listed firm’s earnings management: Evidence from a geographic discontinuity design

We examine how and to what extent minimum wage shapes non-listed firms’ earnings information production. To identify the causality, we introduce an improved geographic information system technique to locate firms in areas that straddle the continuities of county borders and then exploit discontinuities of minimum wage at county borders. We find that firms significantly manage earnings information upward as response to increases in minimum wages, particularly for firms with financial constraints. Our findings shed light on the effects of labor policy on the information production of firms and provide policy implications to regulators concerned with the allocation efficiency of capital markets.     

Religiosity and bank earnings management: Revisiting international evidence

The modernization theory forecasts a sharp declining effect of institutionalized religion on human behavior owing to the extensive economic development. However, this prediction is rejected and proved that religious values and beliefs have a pervasive influence on individual conduct. Based on this salient evidence, we examine the influence of religious social norms on bank earnings management behavior with regard to ongoing economic development. We use 20,715 bank-year observations from 1318 listed banks of eight geographical regions. We, further, employ an updated dataset of 2007–2021 to resemble the economic prosperity time period. Our study discards the prediction of the modernization theory and reveals that banks located in countries with high religiosity are less likely to manage their reported earnings. While comparing conventional banks with Islamic ones, conventional banks are found to be less prone to the earnings management practice than that of their Islamic counterparts. We also find religiosity to have a greater magnitude of effect on the accounting manipulation in the crisis period than in the post-crisis one. The cross-regional differences in religious values bring differential effects on this unethical practice. Our results are robust with the alternative measures of earnings management and alternative model specifications.     

The mobility of top earnings,income, and wealth in China: Facts from the 2011–2017 China household finance survey

We document rich facts of the intra-generational mobility of households in the top fractiles of earnings, income, and wealth distributions in China using the panel data of the 2011–2017 China Household Finance Survey. We find high mobility co-exists with high inequalities within various top fractile groups. In specific, persistence rates of the top 1% group implied an inverted-U pattern for top earnings mobility, a declined trend of top income mobility, and an improved trend for top wealth mobility during the study period. Although the overall trends of mobility for top earnings, income, and wealth showed diverse patterns, they are still considered high from global comparisons. Besides, the top 1% households generate significantly more income from business and allocate a higher fraction of their assets to private equity.     

Credit unions and earnings management to mitigate political scrutiny over tax-exempt status

In this paper, we examine whether credit unions manage earnings to mitigate political scrutiny. In particular, we study whether credit unions increased loan loss provisions to decrease earnings around a 2005 congressional hearing on the efficacy of credit unions’ tax-exempt status. On average, we find evidence consistent with credit unions managing earnings downward via the loan loss provision in the quarters leading up to and surrounding the congressional hearing. In addition, we find that credit unions with higher earnings before the loan loss provision engaged in more downward earnings management than credit unions with lower earnings before provision. Our findings contribute to the literature examining the use of downward earnings management to avoid political scrutiny and the banking literature. Likewise, our results inform the continued debate as to whether credit unions should be tax-exempt.