Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.     

Does the social security fund help non-financial enterprises to transform from the virtual to the real?

At its 19th National Congress, the Communist Party of China vowed to “strengthen the financial sector’s ability to serve the real economy.” However, many studies provide evidence of the opposite trend, a problematic “transition from the real to the virtual,” among Chinese enterprises. Meanwhile, the investment efficiency of China’s Social Security Fund (SSF), a public fund, attracts much attention. In this context, we use A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2018 to study the relationship between holding by the SSF and enterprise financialization. We find that SSF holding significantly inhibits financialization and that this effect is non-linear. Mechanism analysis indicates that SSF holding suppresses enterprises’ financialization mainly by improving their governance. Moreover, SSF holding more strongly inhibits small-scale (vs. large-scale), state-owned (vs. non-state-owned), and non-eastern (vs. eastern) enterprises in China. Furthermore, SSF holding can alleviate corporate value impairment caused by financialization. The conclusions enrich theoretical research and provide empirical evidence that may help regulatory authorities to guide investment by enterprises and prevent financial risks.     

Are Co-integrated Stock Prices Consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

This paper responds to the unsatisfactory argument that there is no correspondence between co-integration and the efficient market hypothesis. A law of one co-integrating vector of prices is proposed for the exchange rate and domestic and overseas stock prices. Markets must therefore be efficient in long-run equilibrium because no arbitrage opportunities exist. However, arbitrage activity via the disequilibrium error correction allows above-average (risk-adjusted) returns to be earned in the short run. The elimination of these arbitrage opportunities means that stock market inefficiency in the short run ensures stock market efficiency in the long run.     

Income distribution, borrowing constraints and redistributive policies

This paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship. We model a two-period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity. In this context, we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent (class) with median income. In particular, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution. The effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class. Empirical results from a panel of 22 OECD countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Inflation, investment and economic performance: The role of internal financing

This paper studies a link between inflation and economic activity that is built on two hypotheses. First, firms mitigate informational frictions in financial markets by accumulating retained earnings over a period of time. Second, firms allocate earnings among three competing uses - dividends, current investment, and the accumulation of internal funds - and inflation directly distorts this allocation decision as well as the real value of accumulated internal funds. The model predicts that the level of inflation - both unanticipated and expected inflation - as well as the variability of inflation distort firms’ internal financing decisions, increases frictions in financial markets, reduces the level and efficiency of investment, and reduces aggregate output. The marginal effects of inflation are increasing in the inflation rate.     

Collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism

Kiyotaki and Moore (J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 211) have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit-constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output. I clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks. A theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in the economy is constrained by the aggregate value of collateral. I illustrate how the constraint reinstates amplification effects and discuss empirical implications of this new mechanism.     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

ARE COMPUTERS AT HOME A FORM OF CONSUMPTION OR AN INVESTMENT? A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS FOR JAPAN*

This study examines the effect on labour market outcomes, of computer possession at home using longitudinal data collected in Japan. There are positive correlations between computer possession and women's full‐time employment and the salaries of both men and women. In a fixed effects analysis, however, no temporal, causal effects of computer possession on labour market outcomes were found. Overall, the results suggest that the positive correlation between computer possession and better labour market outcomes does not imply causality among workers strongly attached to the labour market.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.