Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.     

Agglomeration effects in Europe

The paper estimates agglomeration effects for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Estimation takes into account endogeneity of the spatial distribution of employment and spatial fixed effects. Empirical results suggest that agglomeration effects in these European countries are only slightly smaller than agglomeration effects in the US: the estimated elasticity of (average) labor productivity with respect to employment density is 4.5 percent compared to 5 percent in the US.     

Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?

This paper extends the literature on predation and mergers to a multi-firm setting. Two new arguments why predation is rational when a merger is an alternative are provided. First, predation is less prone to the free-rider problem, since mergers concentrate the costs of eliminating a rival with one firm, whereas predation allows the costs to be spread out. Second, predation can be profitable since it limits the negative effects of the bidding competition for the prey. It is also shown that a restrictive merger policy might be counterproductive by “helping” predators avoid the disadvantageous bidding competition for the prey.     

Private R&;D and Spillovers in European Agriculture

The objective of this paper is to present econometric evidence of the effects of economic incentives, public policies, and institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments. The main hypothesis we will test in this paper is whether agricultural R&D spillovers represent a disincentive for national private R&D. More specifically, we will test if the spillovers function, which is a determinant of private R&D, follows a quadratic form and if private R&D is determined by the role of incentives and institutions.A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, 10–14 March 2004. Comments from participants have been very useful to improve the paper.     

Preponderance of evidence

This paper investigates the incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence when evidence about injurers’ behavior is imperfect. We show that a “more-likely-than-not” decision rule provides maximal incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care. An injurer is then held liable whenever inadequate care appears more likely than due care, and not liable otherwise. Our analysis provides a deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rules of evidence found in common law and the preponderance of evidence standard of proof.     

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.     

从"10+3"看东亚区域经济合作的方式

东亚区域合作面临许多难题，贯穿“东盟方式”的“10 3”合作是东亚目前的主导形式，但这一合作的诸多缺憾使东亚区域合作很难沿这一方向深入下去。2002年初，小泉纯一郎在新加坡描述了一个称为“东亚共同体”的设想，实际是鼓吹以双边自由贸易协定网而非区域经济一体化的方式来实现东亚的区域合作。的确，双边自由贸易协定网的方式不但符合东盟强调自立的合作原则，也迎合了外部特别是美国在这一地区的利益，易为各方接受，却从根本上堵住了东亚通往更具机制化合作的道路。笔者认为东亚区域合作的必然选择是大国协调为基础的区域经济一体化，这虽然需要一个艰难的调整过程，但却是在全球化条件下保障东亚各国利益的惟一选择。     

"10+3"成员国直接税协调的研究

本文介绍了“1O 3” 合作机制的特点、成员国税制和直接税的概况。文中指出,“10 3”成员国政府应高度重视国内税收政策协调问题;尽早建立非官方的税收研究委员会,对各成员国国内税收政策协调问题进行研究;并对企业所得税和个人所得税政策的协调提出建议。