Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure

This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based” regulatory regime.     

Trade costs, firms and productivity

This paper examines the response of U.S. manufacturing industries and plants to changes in trade costs using a unique new dataset on industry-level tariff and transportation rates. Our results lend support to recent heterogeneous-firm models of international trade that predict a reallocation of economic activity towards high-productivity firms as trade costs fall. We find that industries experiencing relatively large declines in trade costs exhibit relatively strong productivity growth. We also find that low-productivity plants in industries with falling trade costs are more likely to die; that relatively high-productivity non-exporters are more likely to start exporting in response to falling trade costs; and that existing exporters increase their shipments abroad as trade costs fall. Finally, we provide evidence of productivity growth within firms in response to decreases in industry-level trade costs.     

Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

Industry Costs of Equity: Incorporating Prior Information

I examine whether incorporating economically motivated prior information yields more accurate forecasts of industry costs of equity. I find that incorporating the long‐run mean of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) parameters and the industry characteristics in the cross section produces more accurate parameter estimates, which subsequently translate into more accurate out‐of‐sample forecasts of industry costs of equity. The outperformance of this method over rolling‐window estimates becomes larger as the forecast horizon extends into the future. These findings provide evidence that the CAPM parameters have a long‐run mean‐reversion property and correlate with the industry characteristics in a systematic way.     

Relative Liquidity,Fund Flows and Short‐Term Demand: Evidence from Exchange‐Traded Funds

We show that highly liquid Exchange‐Traded Funds (ETFs), especially those that are more liquid than their underlying basket of securities (i.e., positive relative liquidity), are particularly attractive to investors. Using three definitions of liquidity, we find that relative liquidity predicts net fund flows, as well as inflows and outflows positively and significantly. We further document a liquidity clientele among institutional investors: (i) relative liquidity is significantly more important for short‐ than for long‐term investors; and (ii) relative liquidity is inversely related to investors’ average holding duration in the ETFs. These two findings provide evidence that relative liquidity encourages short‐term demand.     

ETF Premiums and Liquidity Segmentation

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) provide a means for investors to access assets indirectly that may be accessible at a high cost otherwise. I show that liquidity segmentation can explain the tendency for ETFs to trade at a premium to net asset value (NAV) as well as the life‐cycle pattern in premiums. ETFs with larger NAV tracking error standard deviations (TESDs) tend to trade at higher premiums and the liquidity benefits offered by foreign ETFs and fixed income ETFs are revealed to be the most valuable to investors. Further tests validate that TESD has the desirable properties of a liquidity segmentation measure.     

10kV开关设备检修要点分析及应用

在配电系统中,开关设备是非常关键的部分。它若出现故障,可能引发大面积停电事故,会增加运行成本,降低设备的使用功能,而且有损电力公司的社会形象。本文基于现代电力系统运行要求,重点分析了10kV开关设备检修要点,旨在积累更多运行维护的技术经验,在保证设备功能的前提下,降低运行成本,提高电力系统运行的安全性和可靠性。     

Value and capacity of tax shields: An analysis of the slicing approach

Correctly valuing tax shields has been a challenge in corporate valuation. A recent study by Liu (2009) introduces the slicing approach to separating the tax shield into the earned and unearned parts. Liu also shows that the MM results are wrong, and claims that the slicing approach has finally resolved the issue of pricing tax shields, thereby bringing closure to the topic. However, through careful analysis, we refute Liu’s main claims and restore the MM results. There are still open questions and the topic is not completely resolved as claimed in Liu (2009).     

Heuristic learning and the discovery of specialization and exchange

I develop and calibrate an agent-based model of boundedly rational, adaptive agents in a two-good production and exchange economy to replicate human-subject outcomes in the same eight-person experimental economy. To test agents’ ability to capture human behavior, I extend the model and use its output to make predictions about a second experimental environment in which the group of eight agents is slowly constructed by merging smaller groups. This environment improves human-subject performance in the specialization and exchange task, and commensurate improvement emerges for some parameterizations of the agent-based model. This iterative process yields incremental improvement of decision-level theories about economic discovery.