Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Study on China＇s Logistics Industry in the Information Era

In the information era, China＇s logistics industry faces a development opportunity, as well,as an austere challenge. In order to establish a reasonable strategy in China, it is very important to analyze the logistics industry＇s operation circumstances with a global and informational perception. For this reason, this article analyzes the current situation of China＇s logistics industry, identifies the existing problems, and further finds the possible solutions in present China.     

A comparative site evaluation study for relocating Japanese government agencies out of Tokyo

As a national project of Japan, plans for the relocation of several government agencies out of Tokyo have been ongoing. This paper is concerned with the problem of site selection for this project. The National Land Agency, the agency responsible for this project, has declared that the process of site selection should be rational, open to the public and easily understandable. In an effort to meet these requirements, we propose a consensus-making method for reaching a group decision, based on a combination of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and the Assurance Region model of data envelopment analysis (DEA). Several strategic uses of these methodologies, e.g., Delphi procedures, are also discussed. Based on these analyses, the “Wise Men” Committee for deciding the best site has chosen two from among ten contenders, one from the North-East and the other from the Central part of Japan, as candidates for the best relocation site. We could not discriminate between the two with respect to the multiple criteria chosen for evaluating sites. The Committee recommended the two sites to the Prime Minister at the end of December 1999. The Prime Minister reported this conclusion to the Diet. This topic is currently the focus of political discussions in the Diet. In this report, the authors summarize the decision-making processes that the Wise Men Committee followed, putting emphasis on the methodological aspects.     

A Statement of Accounting Concepts for Level 1 of the Conceptual Framework?

The type of reporting found in corporate governance includes financial reporting, but over time various arguments have developed regarding a tension found between conventional and financial type reporting, especially as to the role of financial statements. Further tensions follow from the introduction of economic and social issues within both conventional accounting and financial reports.
This article argues that distinct, though related, frameworks at particular levels are required. The mingling of conventional accounting with financial and economic ideas and issues is evident in the conceptual framework (CF) project where there is reference to economic benefits and costs in making economic decisions for the allocation of resources. This results in a misconception of the function of these distinct types of information. An unravelling of particular issues will require a Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) for Level 1 of the CF.     

信息不对称在农业保险中的表现极其防范

信息不对称严重阻碍了农业保险的健康发展，建议通过建立克服农业保险中信息不对称的有效体系，以促进我国农业保险的健康发展。     

Endogenous Growth and Negative Externalities

Received March 5, 2001; revised version received August 5, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Theory and practice of value management and its innovation for natural resources from the perspective of sustainable development

The supreme obstacle for sustainable development of natural resources is the scarecity, bottleneck. So how to promote the sustainable utilizing and increase the using efficiency of natural resources is worth studying. This paper suggests that we should improve the model and means of evaluating method and value management based on th~ theory of natural resource compensation. This paper discusses the User Cost Method based on the microeeonomicaspect which can change the evaluating method for natural resources. From the perspective of value managemen model, we should use the User Cost Method to realize the linkage and integration of micro and macro eompensation for natural resources. Based on the evaluating and aecounting idea User Cost Method, this paper presents a theo. retical framework to harmonize and link micro and macro compensation for natural resources. At present, we should seek the new approach and method to manage natural resources, so can we realize the capitalization managemen focusing on the vahte management for natural resources.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.