Pricing the risks of default

This paper decomposes default risk into timing and recovery risks. The two default components are explicitly priced as if they were traded in the futures market. We develop estimation strategies evaluating recovery risks and then construct implicit prices of contingent securities reflecting purely the timing risk. The models are estimated on monthly data for rates on certificates of deposit offered by institutions in the Savings and Loan Industry, during the 1987–1991 period. Empirical results support market expectations of lower likelihoods of default after 1989.     

论网络文化环境中的网络道德教育

随着信息产业的发展,网络已经遍布我们生活和工作的各个领域。网络文化也正急剧地改变着人们的道德观念、价值取向以及行为模式。数字化、网络化、信息化改变了人们的生产方式、生活方式和思维方式,网络信息的确给人们带来了诸多方便。然而,网络中的不良现象却影响了网络环境建设,并干扰着正常秩序,危害着传统道德,侵蚀着人们的思想。为了确保网络环境建设的健康进行,网络道德教育势在必行。     

Asian Financial Crisis.Prologue and the Case of Thailand

We suggest that the Asian financial crisis began because of theinconsistent exchange rate system and miss-management within Thailand. We showthat prior tothe Asian financial crisis the Thai Baht against the Yen followed the theoryofpurchasing power parity but the Baht against the U.S. Dollar did not. We givebriefsummaries of the papers included in this issue.     

我国风险投资事业的法律制度建设研究

法律制度作为制度环境的重要组成部分，对社会的制度安排的演化和创新起着或制约或推动的作用。本文通过对风险投资这种金融创新的制度经济学分析，列举了目前我国法律制度供给与风险投资制度安排需求的冲突与滞后，指出政府进行法律制度的创新才是发展风险投资事业的关键。     

我国房地产交易中存在的道德风险及其治理

本文用信息经济学理论分析了我国房地产交易中开发商、中介机构可能存在的道德风险及其带来的负面影响,在此基础上,分别从开发商、政府、购房者以及中介机构四个角度提出了治理房地产交易中道德风险的方法和措施。     

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.     

社会保障政策目标X-低效率分析：一个新的研究视角

X-低效率分析是社会保障政策目标分析的一个新的研究视角。＂漏桶理论＂天然地诠释了社会保障X-低效率存在的原因,社会保障制度作为社会的稳定器和安全网,其政策效率目标在运作过程中会产生一定漏出量,引发X-低效率现象。政府失灵、制度设计管理缺陷、道德风险与负面激励共同构成了社会保障政策目标X-低效率的客观诱因。     

证券投资基金中的委托代理问题

从分析证券投资基金的委托代理关系入手 ,讨论了由于基金存在两级契约安排所引起的逆选择和道德风险问题 ,提出只有设计一系列制度安排以减少信息成本和激励成本 ,投资基金才能凭借其特有的优势 ,发挥出集合投资、分散风险、专家理财、企业监控的功能。具体探讨了第一、第二级契约安排中的委托代理问题。     

股票期权激励陷阱研究

理论上讲我国实施股票期权可以有效解决经理人长期激励不足和经营者道德风险问题,也有利于上市公司降低委托成本,吸引并稳定人才.但由于我国股票市场不完善及股东与管理者的信息不对称等问题的存在,股票期权激励机制在我国的运用效果欠佳,从而产生了激励陷阱.文章通过对股权激励陷阱表现形式及形成原因的分析,提出了规避此类陷阱的具体措施.     

Evergreening in banking

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.