When Are Commercial Loans Secured?

We analyze the factors that influence the decision to secure a commercial loan. We find evidence that variables reflecting adverse selection, moral hazard, and the prospects for default all affect the likelihood a loan will be collateralized. We find no evidence in favor of the predictions of certain theoretical models that high‐quality firms signal by providing collateral. Our results also show that lenders with less risk protection in the form of equity capital are more likely to require collateral, but that banks themselves are less likely to secure loans than nonbanks. Certain loan characteristics also influence the collateralization decision.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Cooperative ventures in emerging economies

Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow.     

Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital

This paper examines the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance and venture capital. With bank finance, the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to exert effort. With venture capital finance, there is a two-sided moral hazard problem as both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (VC) provide unverifiable effort. The entrepreneur benefits from the VC's managerial input but must surrender partial ownership of the venture, thus diluting the entrepreneur's incentive to provide effort. Venture capital tends to be preferred to bank finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low.     

On the discrete mean past lifetime

Let T denote a positive discrete survival time and n a non-negative integer number. Properties of the mean past lifetime E(n  −  T|T  <  n) are provided. M. Asadi’s work is supported by the University of Isfahan Grant 850713.     

股票价格稳定性的非参数平滑估计

股票的优质性主要由股票价格的稳定性来决定。通过建立条件风险函数非参数平滑估计的估计方法,证明条件风险函数平滑后的非参数估计值具有一致性和渐进正态性,并将此方法扩展到了截尾数据中。通过蒙特卡罗模拟表明条件风险函数平滑后的非参数估计值在非截尾数据以及截尾数据中的有限样本行为都要优于非平滑的估计值。实证分析中用截尾数据条件风险函数非参数平滑估计方法非参数估计中国14大行业股票价格的稳定性,发现房地产行业的股票价格最不稳定,建筑材料行业的股票价格表现最稳定     

Where Do Financial Constraints Originate from? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets

Despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints, the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed. This paper offers such an analysis. We study, in particular, the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the SMEs face. We also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the SMEs than the latter. Finally, we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms, just like Peter Diamond’s (1989) model predicts.     

略论保险利益对道德危险的防范作用

保险利益是保险法中防范道德危险最直接、最有效的法律制度,不过其作用的发挥受到该制度具体内容的影响。要以对道德危险的防范为中心,探讨保险利益内涵的法律界定方式、该原则的效力范围以及人身保险中保险利益等颇具争议性的问题。通过对比国外立法经验和考查我国现行法律规定的不足,为我国保险法的完善提出建议。     

How do Scores of DIT and MJT Differ? A Critical Assessment of the Use of Alternative Moral Development Scales in Studies of Business Ethics

The construct of Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) has drawn much attention in the study of business ethics for over two decades. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has made a significant contribution to the literature as an easy-to-administer CMD instrument, and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), an alternative scale, has also been used widely especially in Europe. The two scales differ in their approaches to measuring CMD, focusing on stage preference (DIT) and stage consistency (MJT), yet empirical comparisons have been scarce. The present research empirically compares the two scales in terms of their correspondence with ethical ideology as a reference scale, and it demonstrates a clear distinction between the DIT and the MJT. Although they both aim to measure CMD, their dissimilar approaches lead to distinctly different implications.     

银行危机救助策略的分析

银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现:当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。