Resiliency in the E-mini futures market

We study how quickly liquidity is replenished on the order book in E-mini futures. The results show that participants who use patient methods, such as limit orders, are often fast to place new orders, while those using impatient market orders are slow to re-enter the market. These delays are a function of state constants, such as firm types, state conditions, such as whether the order is price improving, and time-varying covariates, such as the volume of trade during the gap. We also find support for the view that certain traders delay providing liquidity during active markets to avoid informed trading.     

The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure

This article discusses issues that arise when service providers place network equipment on publicly owned lands in the United States. Based on land use policy at the Federal Communications Commission, this paper theorizes that the use of public lands for 5G network development will create a moral hazard, as service providers may be tempted to take risks in the way they use public lands. Per economic theory the firm could behave recklessly when knowing that the costs will be borne by someone else – in this case local citizens. This is an example of the moral hazard problem in economics.     

How do low-income enrollees in the Affordable Care Act marketplaces respond to cost-sharing?

The Affordable Care Act requires insurers to offer cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) to low-income consumers on the marketplaces. We link 2013–2015 All-Payer Claims Data to 2004–2013 administrative hospital discharge data from Utah and exploit policy-driven differences in the actuarial value of CSR plans that are solely determined by income. This allows us to examine the effect of cost-sharing on medical spending among low-income individuals. We find that enrollees facing lower levels of cost-sharing have higher levels of healthcare spending, controlling for past healthcare use. We estimate demand elasticities of total health care spending among this low-income population of approximately −0.12, suggesting that demand-side price mechanisms in health insurance design work similarly for low-income and higher-income individuals. We also find that cost-sharing subsidies substantially lower out-of-pocket medical care spending, showing that the CSR program is a key mechanism for making health care affordable to low-income individuals.     

论现代市场经济的社会组织形态——有价的经济交换与无价的社会交换

在现代市场经济社会中，经济交换与社会交换是行为机理和组织形态的基础性和决定性因素，不仅决定市场经济运行的机理逻辑，而且决定市场经济的社会组织形态。经济交换的特质是有价交换、计量交换，且在均衡条件下是等价交换；社会交换的特质是无价交换、间接交换和异质回报。经济交换的长期化，可以使个体利己行为导向博弈互利，即从个体利己行为导向各方相对获利；社会交换的长期化，可以使个体的非利己行为导向共同利己，即有利于共同体繁荣及各个体获利。企业行为必须适应性地嵌入社会系统；相应地，社会目标被自觉地嵌入企业行为。经济交换的市场机制，是伟大的自发性组织行为模式创造，而社会交换与市场交换的嵌入性组织行为模式，更是人类发展的伟大创造。在新时代，当信息技术广泛应用于经济社会交换过程，数字成为经济性和社会性资源(要素),经济社会的交换机理将发生深刻变化：有价的经济交换和无价的社会交换必须有新的协同方式，推动组织行为和组织效率的创新发展。现代市场经济组织形态和组织行为的合法性和有效性的核心理据和制度逻辑基础，就是经济交换与社会交换行为的性质区分和功能协调。把握经济交换与社会交换的机理逻辑，就能理解现代市场经济发展的组织...