证券投资基金“老鼠仓”问题研究

所谓"老鼠仓"是指庄家在用公有资金拉升股价之前,先用自己个人的资金在低位建仓,待用公有资金拉升到高位后个人仓位率先卖出获利.它实质上是利用内幕信息进行违规的利益输送问题,是一种损害证券投资基金持有人利益的不道德行为.主要针对"老鼠仓"形成的原因进行了分析,并提出构建"老鼠仓"防火墙的对策措施.     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

从美国公司财务假帐丑闻看公司治理和社会制约的完善

美国公司财务假帐频繁产生的原因有：公司管理制度和公司治理结构方面的变化对企业的约束力下降在社会中介机构的独立审计制度下部分中介机构与造假公司同流合污，法律制度的缺陷与不完备，以及政府对企业投资银行和征券行业的监管机制不健全等。有鉴于此，我国公司应建立、健全监音管理机制，并加强公司内部控制。     

互联网下会计电算化内部控制研究

实施网络会计给企业带来利益的同时也给企业内部控制带来新问题 ,建立适应互联网环境的内部控制 ,其措施应基于企业内部网络和外部网络两大方面来进行。     

A framework for the analysis of firm risk communication

In this paper, we propose a framework for the analysis of risk communication and an index to measure the quality of risk disclosure. Mainstream literature on voluntary disclosure has emphasized that quantity can be used as a sound proxy for quality. We contend that, in the analysis of the disclosure of risks made by public companies, attention has to be paid not only to how much is disclosed but also to what is disclosed and how.We apply the framework to a sample of nonfinancial companies listed in the ordinary market on the Italian Stock Exchange. To verify that the framework and synthetic index are not influenced by the two factors recognized in the literature as the most powerful drivers of disclosure behavior for listed companies, we use an OLS model. The regression shows that the index of disclosure quantity is not influenced either by size or industry. Thus, the synthetic measure can be used to rank the quality of the disclosure of risks.     

浅谈我国银行内部审计的发展

银行内部审计随着银行业务的扩大，越来越受到高层管理者的重视，它是由相对独立、较为超胶铁稽核部门来执行的一种再监督。加入WTO以后，银行稽核工作从观念到工作方法都将发生重大变革。首先是观念的变革，银行内部审计的重点将由事后审计向事前审计转移，突出表现为检查风险向控制风险转移，内容由财务收支、资产质量等专项稽核向整体评价转移，更加注重绩效审计，同时加强对风险评估和管理方面的审计；其次是工作方法的变化，手段上充分利用计算机处理原始数据，方法上改变过去被动地接受稽核项目，按稽核方案对所辖行实施无差别的稽核，转为利用内部控制评价结果有区别地决定稽核对象、稽核频率、现场稽核的检查面。     

军队物资库存的一个最优控制问题

讨论了非均衡军队物资库存问题，以最优控制理论为工具，得出了消耗量与库存量之间的变量关系，从而达到在保障供应的前提下，提高军事经济效益的目的     

Analysing Perceived Downside Risk: the Component Value‐at‐Risk Framework

Multinational companies face increasing risks arising from external risk factors, e.g. exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices, which they have learned to hedge using derivatives. However, despite increasing disclosure requirements, a firm's net risk profile may not be transparent to shareholders. We develop the ‘Component Value‐at‐Risk (VaR)’ framework for companies to identify the multi‐dimensional downside risk profile as perceived by shareholders. This framework allows for decomposing downside risk into components that are attributable to each of the underlying risk factors. The firm can compare this perceived VaR, including its composition and dynamics, to an internal VaR based on net exposures as it is known to the company. Any differences may lead to surprises at times of earnings announcements and thus constitute a litigation threat to the firm. It may reduce this information asymmetry through targeted communication efforts.     

企业控制机制:控制权争夺的边界和效应

公司兼并和收购市场中企业控制权机机制、控制权争夺的价值、控制权争夺的福利效应、大股东在公司控制权争夺中对公司政策产生影响。外部性排除了负有义务的股东完全取得接管收益的可能性,无论控制权争夺的结果如何,股东财富在控制权争夺其间是增加的。从股东的福利效应方面来说,控制权争夺的失败也就是股东财富的损失。大股东提高了预期利润,并且他们所占股份越多,则提高越大。董事会的失误导致了敌意接管的出现,可由公司控制的外部市场对董事会的疏忽作用进行弥补。     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.