The value of bank capital buffers in maintaining financial system resilience

There is a current controversy concerning the appropriate size of banks’ capital requirements, and the trade-off between the costs and benefits of implementing higher capital requirements. We quantify the size of capital buffers required to reduce system-wide losses using confidential regulatory data for Australian banks from 2002 to 2014 and annual public accounts from 1978 to 2014. We find that a moderate increase in bank capital buffers is sufficient to maintain financial system resilience, even after taking economic downturns into consideration. Furthermore, while banks benefit from paying a lower cost of debt when they have a higher capital buffer, lending volumes are lower indicating that credit supply may be hampered if bank capital levels are too high within a financial system.     

Overlapping portfolios,contagion, and financial stability

We study the problem of interacting channels of contagion in financial networks. The first channel of contagion is counterparty failure risk; this is captured empirically using data for the Austrian interbank network. The second channel of contagion is overlapping portfolio exposures; this is studied using a stylized model. We perform stress tests according to different protocols. For the parameters we study neither channel of contagion results in large effects on its own. In contrast, when both channels are active at once, bankruptcies are much more common and have large systemic effects.     

Heterogeneity risks and negative externality

Diversified institutions coexist in financial markets with different degrees of exposure and contribution to the systemic risk. Therefore, the identification and regulation of systemically important institutions are of great significance. This paper investigates the negative externality in a model where the heterogeneity risks of institutions interact and alienate the value of each other, with the bankruptcy risk acting as the kernel factor. The market negative externality increases when the bankruptcy risk is high. Furthermore, as an institution with a minimum tail index, the “first domino” dominates the bankruptcy risk of the market. The first domino accumulation and phantasm are prone to cause systemic crises. The market bankruptcy index decreases as the non-first domino participates in the risk sharing. Finally, we empirically study implications of the above findings for adjusting the market structure and managing risks, in the Chinese financial markets.     

基于房地产市场的我国系统性金融风险测度与预警研究

本文阐释了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险形成机制,据此建立了分阶段、跨部门的房地产市场的系统性金融风险网络模型,并运用2006-2017年16家上市银行数据,分析和测度了我国房价大幅下跌所引发的系统性金融风险水平和结构,构建了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标并进行测算。研究发现:在房价下跌30%的压力情景下,我国金融体系的潜在总损失总体呈级数式上升,年均增长22.70%;基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险值(SR)呈现先上升后波动下降的总体趋势;系统性金融风险(SR)的脆弱性指标(FLI)整体呈现波浪式振荡变化,且与房地产贷款/权益整体呈反向变动,系统性金融风险(SR)的传染性指标(CTI)在2012-2017年呈持续下降趋势,且与金融市场压力指数、金融机构间资产占总资产比重呈现出高度的一致性变化趋势。最后,基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标(SRWI)值呈收敛式振荡走势,表明基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险总体可控且呈收敛式下降。     

The multiplex structure of interbank networks

The interbank market has a natural multiplex network representation. We employ a unique database of supervisory reports on Italian banks to the Banca d’Italia that includes all bilateral exposures broken down by maturity and by the secured and unsecured nature of the contract. We find that layers have different topological properties and persistence over time. The presence of a link in a layer is not a good predictor of the presence of the same link in other layers. Maximum entropy models reveal different unexpected substructures, such as network motifs, in different layers. Using the total interbank network or focusing on a specific layer as representative of the other layers provides a poor representation of interlinkages in the interbank market and could lead to biased estimation of systemic risk.     

基于边际效应的银行个体系统性风险贡献测度研究

本文使用系统性风险β值法度量我国上市银行的系统性风险以及上市银行对系统性风险的贡献度。研究结果表明,单个机构对系统性风险的贡献不仅取决于系统性风险β值,还受到其个体风险值的影响。总体而言,国有大型商业银行的系统性风险β值高于中小股份制商业银行,对系统性风险的边际贡献和影响也较大。但中小股份制商业银行抵御风险的能力相对较弱,尽管β值较小,一旦个体风险值急剧增加,其对系统性风险的影响也可能超过国有大型商业银行。因此,系统性风险的防范既要关注那些系统性风险β值大的银行,也要关注个体风险值可能出现剧烈波动的中小银行。     

Adoption of navigation technologies: Five historical and contemporary cases

Five navigation technologies are studied with the aim of discovering why some of them have more difficulties and take longer time than the others to develop and reach the users. The case histories of their development are presented and compared according to their technological antecedents, their applications and the organizations involved. The analysis shows that multiple stakeholders with different agendas coupled with technological uncertainties and ambiguities have a negative impact on adoption. It also shows that entrepreneurs can play a significant role in accelerating the diffusion of technological innovations if the technological system allows for the parallel development of complements or new markets. The paper also highlights the need for deeper understanding of how complex products and systems should be managed in an environment marked by interconnectedness and multiple influential stakeholders.     

Regulatory Optimal Bank Size

This paper presents a study of potential outcomes of bank growth. Banks grow by expanding market presence within the geographic region within which they are domiciled and by expanding presence into other regions via new implantations. Growth leads to improved diversification, but also results in an increase in the risk of catastrophe that a bank’s failure may engender. The conclusion is that there will exist a threshold size of bank at which the rate of growth in its systemic risk exceeds the rate of decline in its risk of insolvency. An empirical study of US bank call report data provides results that are consistent with the theory presented in the first part of the paper.

Equilibrium asset pricing with systemic risk

We provide an equilibrium multi-asset pricing model with micro- founded systemic risk and heterogeneous investors. Systemic risk arises due to excessive leverage and risk taking induced by free-riding externalities. Global risk-sensitive financial regulations are introduced with a view of tackling systemic risk, with Value-at-Risk a key component. The model suggests that risk-sensitive regulation can lower systemic risk in equilibrium, at the expense of poor risk-sharing, an increase in risk premia, higher and asymmetric asset volatility, lower liquidity, more comovement in prices, and the chance that markets may not clear. We thank Michel Habib, José Scheinkman, Hyun Shin and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Jean-Pierre Zigrand is a lecturer in Finance at the LSE, and is the corresponding author. The authors would like to acknowledge financial support under the EPSRC Grant GR/S83975/01 at the Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.     

基于信用创造机制下金融衍生工具交易后风险分类及法律监管

金融衍生市场具有信用创造功能,其货币创造原理、抵押品、证券化程度以及对信用扩张能力与商业银行传统的信用创造机制相比有很大的区别。独特的信用创造机制放大了金融衍生工具交易后面临的市场风险、信用风险、流动性风险、法律风险,从而增加了系统性危机发生的可能性。重新构建我国金融衍生工具交易后监管的框架,是达到对系统性风险有效监控的必然选择。