通货膨胀、通货紧缩及金融危机根本治理

本文从"全面价值论"的经济学理论"核心"出发,给出了根本治理通货膨胀、通货紧缩及金融危机的具体方法,为建立世界性的健康态金融社会提供了坚实的理论基础和保障。     

Japan's Deflation and the Bank of Japan's Experience with Nontraditional Monetary Policy

This paper offers a brief summary of nontraditional monetary policy measures adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) during the last two decades, especially the period 1998–2006, when the so‐called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative easing (QE) were put in place. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable at low interest and inflation rates. They are: strategy (i), management of expectations about future policy rates; strategy (ii), targeted asset purchases; and strategy (iii), QE. Alternatively, QE may be decomposed into a pure attempt to inflate the central bank balance sheet, QE0, purchases of assets in dysfunctional markets, QE1, and purchases of assets to generate portfolio rebalancing, QE2. Strategy (ii), when nonsterilized, is either QE1 or QE2. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and discuss evidence on the effectiveness of the measures. The broad conclusion is that strategies (i) and (ii) have affected interest rates, while no clear evidence exists so far of the effectiveness of the pure form of strategy (iii), or QE0. Strategy (ii) has been effective especially in containing risk/liquidity premiums in dysfunctional money markets; that is, QE1 has been effective. The effectiveness of QE2, however, is less clear‐cut. The strategies, however, have failed to bring the Japanese economy out of the deflation trap so far. I discuss some possible reasons for this and also implications for the current U.S. situation.     

Why Has Japan Failed to Escape from Deflation?

Japan has failed to escape from deflation despite an extraordinary monetary policy easing over the past 4 years. Monetary easing undoubtedly stimulated aggregate demand, leading to an improvement in the output gap. However, since the Phillips curve was almost flat, prices have hardly reacted at all. Against this background, the key question is why prices were so sticky. To examine this, we use sectoral price data for Japan and seven other countries including the USA, and use these data to compare the shape of the price change distribution across the eight countries. Our main finding is that Japan differs significantly from the other countries in that the mode of the distribution is very close to zero for Japan, while it is near 2% for other countries. This suggests that while in the USA and other countries the “default” is for firms to raise prices by about 2% each year, in Japan the default is that, as a result of prolonged deflation, firms keep their prices unchanged.     

开放经济下中国货币政策与汇率政策冲突分析

纵观1994年以来的我国货币政策与汇率政策,从货币政策和汇率政策冲突的检验标准人手,对中国货币政策与汇率政策之间的冲突进行了实证分析.得出两者出现的冲突基本上可以归纳为人民币对内币值和人民币对外币值之间的矛盾,前者包括控制通货膨胀和遏制通货紧缩两个方面.可见造成货币政策与汇率政策冲突的根源在于经济的开放性.     

当前中国面临的通货紧缩威胁及应对措施

受全球金融危机的影响,中国的宏观经济形势自2008年10月开始由通货膨胀向通货紧缩迅速转变。虽然目前中国还没有进入全面通货紧缩状态,但通货紧缩压力带来的负面影响已经在工业生产领域有所表现：通货紧缩导致企业投资不振、收益下降,并增加了企业债务负担;同时,通货紧缩也大大抑制了居民消费和出口。中国目前的通货紧缩的内在原因在于其自身投资需求、消费需求都趋于萎缩,因此,防止中国出现严重通货紧缩的基本思路是“扩大需求、改善供给”。     

通货紧缩问题述评

自从 1 997年 1 0月我国宏观经济运行中出现通货紧缩现象后 ,学术界对这一问题进行了较为充分的讨论。在目前宏观经济已经止跌回升 ,出现较好增长势头的情况下 ,本文从通货紧缩的界定、通货紧缩的成因、通货紧缩的危害、摆脱通货紧缩的途径等四方面对这一讨论的成果进行了综述和评论。     

通货紧缩传导理论的比较研究

通货紧缩往往伴随有经济衰退,其对经济的影响可能比通货膨胀更严重。各国对通货紧缩的治理也存在着政策上的冲突,要实现对通货紧缩的有效治理,必须明确通货紧缩的传导机制。在介绍通货紧缩传导的一般理论基础上,比较研究封闭经济条件下通货紧缩的自足性现象和开放经济条件下通货紧缩的国际传导机制。分析表明我国目前不存在通货紧缩输出的条件。     

How could everyone have been so wrong? Forecasting the Great Depression with the railroads

Contemporary observers viewed the recession that began in the summer of 1929 as nothing extraordinary. Using a neglected data set of forecasts by railroad shippers, we find that business was surprised by the magnitude of the Great Depression. We show that simple time series methods would have produced much smaller forecast errors than those indicated by the surveys, thus indicating that the survey forecasts were formed using more information than just the past history of the series. The depth and duration of the depression was beyond the experience of business, which appears to have believed that recovery would happen quickly as in previous recessions. Forecasts of inflation are then constructed using the survey forecasts. We find little evidence that the deflation that occurred during the Great Depression was foreseen, thus emphasizing the role of debt deflation in the propagation of the depression.     

Financial Market Imperfections, Labour Market Imperfections and Business Cycles

A Greenwald–Stiglitz (1993a) style rational expectations business cycle model is introduced in which uncorrelated productivity shocks or monetary shocks generate autocorrelated employment fluctuations due to financial constraints. The propagation mechanism is carefully modelled: because of capital market imperfections (only standard debt contracts are traded), firms' labour demand changes in response to changes in their balance-sheet position; because of labour market imperfections (efficiency wages), employment and unemployment fluctuate in response to shifts in labour demand. The virtue of the model is its simplicity. Despite the fact that unemployment is endogenous, the dynamic behaviour of the model under rational expectations can be characterised analytically.
JEL classification : E 32     

The Bank of England and Parliament were monetarily adroit during the Napoleonic Wars

Abstract

With the connivance of Parliament, was the Bank of England's over issue of banknotes inflationary? The inflation stemmed from military subsidy and Peninsula campaign payments, as well as food imports, far in excess of Britain's export earnings to cover these capital transfers (particularly when crimped by the Continental Blockade), and not merely from domestic credit over issue. Neither domestic money creation nor the fiscal theory of the price level best explains the imbalance in Britain's international accounts during the Napoleonic Wars. This deficit stemmed from domestic production shortfalls in essentials (above all food production) and contractual obligations such as military spending/subsidies relative to the pound's international purchasing power which emanated from the ability of Britain to sell exports and replace imports with domestic output (raise food production internally). These types of highly inelastic transactions tended to operate independently of domestic money creation, fiscal policy (taxes) or price developments (inflation). This article tracks England's bullion debate, which concerned whether gold prices rose (and hence sterling's exchange rate fell) because military capital transfers overwhelmed the balance of payments, or because the Bank of England over issued paper money after the gold cover was removed in 1797. The issues herein are not antiquated because the primary issues in monetary debates for two centuries have concerned the cause of inflation and deflation, and whether the domestic money supply or the balance of payments is responsible. Determining actual causation is critical for the proper solution: monetary deflation, or domestic and international restructuring of trade and investment.