林农可持续经营模式行为选择与约束影响分析

基于广东省韶关市抽样调查样本数据,对集体林权改革后农户林业经营模式的选择行为影响因素进行分析,利用Logistic模型对农户选择行为与各个自变量进行了回归。认为农户家庭的劳动力,林地的细碎化程度,农民对集体林改的了解程度,农户林权的完备程度以及林业收入占家庭总收入的比重等因素对农户林业经营模式的选择行为具有不同程度和方向的影响。文章在对回归结果分析的基础上结合SSCP范式,对农户选择行为逻辑做了较为深入的剖析和解释,认为林业经营模式只有与资源特征与制度环境相匹配时才能实现效益的最大化和经营的可持续性。     

2011年集体林权制度改革效果监测报告

通过对福建等7个省、56县、279村、2800户的入户调查,研究了样本地区集体林权制度改革进展和取得的成效:农户经营林地面积翻一番,营林投资水平提高,森林资源量质双增,林地产出率增加,农户对改革措施总体满意。急需国家在扩大政策性森林保险范围、发展林业合作组织、加强林业科技服务、强林惠林等方面出台政策。最后,从农户政策需求出发,探讨了国家下一步政策的基本取向,并在此基础上提出政策建议。     

林权变动对森林资源培育和木材供给的影响分析

基于林地配置和木材供给的计量经济学模型,利用7个南方县的面板数据进行实证分析。回归结果显示,经济发展对森林覆盖率产生正面的影响,人口压力对森林覆盖率有消极的影响,采伐等相关成本上升和实际利率提高会减少市场上商品材的供给。结果还显示,林权改革显著地增加了南方集体林区商品材供给,但由于样本数据观测期短,暂未发现林权改革增加南方集体林区森林覆盖率。     

我国林权抵押贷款研究综述

通过对2003年以后我国的林权抵押贷款相关文献的梳理归整,重点对林权抵押贷款中涉及的理论基础、森林资源资产评估、贷款模式进行分析总结,对不同的森林资源所对应的资产评估和贷款模式进行了分类汇总。在林权抵押贷款实证研究汇总中,对林权抵押贷款的主要运行模式及其内容或特征进行了重点分析。讨论了目前关于林权抵押贷款研究存在的主要问题,认为我国林权抵押贷款的研究在基础理论、森林资源资产评估体系建立、抵押贷款的模式创新以及众学者提出的问题和对策针对性方面均有所欠缺,并提出了相应建议。     

城市化进程中的农民问题

农民问题已经成为阻碍中国城市化健康快速发展的最大障碍。农民问题主要指失地农民生活保障、城乡居民收入差距不断拉大以及农民进入城市所引起的一系列社会问题。在实地调研的基础上分析城市化进程中农民问题形成的根源——农民的“非自愿”进城和农民的贫困。彻底解决城市化进程中农民问题的对策,应以市场化为导向,改革现行农村土地制度;在集体所有制基础上,通过赋予农民土地永久承包权、物化农民土地使用权、建立城乡一体化的土地使用权交易市场,盘活农村具有“巨额”潜在价值的土地资产。     

上市公司独立董事行为有效性及激励机制研究

独立董事制度是公司治理结构的一项制度创新,独立董事制度的建立应当以其作用的有效性为核心。独立董事的有效性与独立董事人数比例、教育背景、年龄结构等有着密切关系,而且需要通过有效的激励和约束机制才能充分发挥其作用。     

External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

Identifying and addressing land governance constraints to support intensification and land market operation: Evidence from 10 African countries

Beyond concerns about agricultural productivity growth, issues of land governance have attracted global interest as demand for land acquisition by outsiders has increased rapidly but most of the transfers failed to live up to expectations and instead disrupted local livelihoods. We use the land governance assessment framework to identify key conceptual issues and identify how land governance in 10 African countries compares to global good practice. Results point towards weak protection of rights in practice, large gaps in female land access, and limited outreach and effectiveness of institutions to record rights and adjudicate disputes. We note that programs to improve performance along these lines had significant impact in other contexts, suggesting that efforts to improve land governance will be warranted and should be closely monitored and evaluated in an effort to identify models suited to African conditions and assess their impact and interaction with other factor markets.     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.     

Firms’ performance following the initial resignation of independent directors: evidence from Taiwan

This study investigates the operating performance of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange following the initial resignation of independent directors. The results show that the firms’ operating performance following the resignation of these directors has not only deteriorated, but is also significantly below the industry average. In addition, firms with a relatively severe agency problem, including firms that have lower insider or institutional shareholdings, receive audit opinions other than unqualified opinions or change their auditors prior to the resignation of the independent directors, tend to perform more poorly following the resignation.