Taxing Nothing – Tax Arbitrage and the Vanishing Revenue from Capital Income Taxation

In a one-period model the implications of the German tax code, concerning capital taxation, onto the capital market equilibrium are examined. Therefore, we model a corporation sector subject to the corporation tax and private investors liable to private income taxation. We show that there neither exist any possibilities for local tax arbitrage nor tax clienteles. Extending the model for stocks and derivative financial instruments, the tax base for private capital income taxation vanishes and the tax revenue drops to zero.revised version received September 3, 2003     

Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies

The paper develops a theoretical rationale for a non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and government spending. A model is presented showing why and how political participation influences the spending behavior of opportunistic governments that can choose an optimal combination of rents and public goods to attract political support. If the level of democracy remains low, governments rationally prefer rents as an instrument to assure political support. With increasing democratic participation, however, rents become an increasingly expensive (per unit of political support) instrument while the provision of public goods becomes more and more efficient in ensuring the incumbent government's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy, which drives a country from a pure autocracy to a semi-participatory system, tends to reduce government spending, while an increase in political participation from a semi-participatory country to a full democracy tends to raise the size of the public sector.     

Net national emissions, CO2 taxation and the role of forestry

The concept of net national emissions suggests that accumulation of carbon in forestry should be taken into account when countries buy CO₂ permits or pay CO₂ taxes. The paper analyses the question of the correct tax/subsidy programme for giving proper incentives to forest owners and utilizers of wood. The analysis uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with productive capital and the stock of forests as state variables. It turns out that in a decentralized economy forest owners should be subsidized and CO₂ emissions should be taxed independently of whether they originates from wood or fossil fuels.     

Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed

We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.     

可持续发展的税收政策取向

可持续发展是人类社会共同的主题,其核心是经济的可持续发展,而经济的可持续发展关键在于协调经济发展与环境、资源的矛盾关系.税收政策应围绕着节约资源和环境保护为重点,借鉴西方国家的经验,进一步改革和完善原有税制,在促进经济社会可持续发展过程中发挥重要作用.     

分税制下政府行为的扭曲与矫治

分税制条件下政府行为存在种种扭曲现象。产生这一问题有经济、政治和社会三方面原因。有效的矫治对策包括:优化政府职能,完善财税体制,整顿财经秩序,推进依法治税等。     

房地产市场税收调控效应及其调整思路——基于税负转嫁与税负合理分配的分析

税收是调节房地产市场最有效的经济杠杆之一,现行的调控政策几乎都是从流转环节入手,导致政策实施的实际效果较差。而从现行房地产市场的税负分配和税负转嫁的角度进行分析可发现:在现行房地产税收调控实践中,只有充分考虑整个房地产市场税负分配及现实中房地产市场的税负转嫁,才能找到政策调控的正确着力点。现行房地产市场税收调控政策的重点应是对空置的房地产征收较重的保有环节的税收,对百姓消费居住的房地产则应实施合理的减免税。     

构建和谐税收征纳关系的探索与思考——基于昆山经验的调查分析

构建和谐的税收征纳关系是坚持科学发展观,建设社会主义和谐社会的重要组成部分。本文基于昆山地税系统的经验,阐述了构建和谐的征纳关系的一些见解和思考。     

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.      

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28