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71.
This paper analyzes platform selection (affiliation) by game developers in the Japanese home video game industry. We develop an elementary model of affiliation by software developers and propose the hypothesis that wider availability of game titles for a platform positively inclines game developers to affiliate with that platform when releasing new game titles. Then, using data for Japan, we estimate a multinomial logit model that includes both the attributes of game developers and the characteristics of platforms, and find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Overall, the findings suggest that game developers expect the indirect network effect to apply, and the prospect of future growth matters to them when deciding with which platform to affiliate. 相似文献
72.
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. 相似文献
73.
《Research in Economics》2014,68(4):306-314
There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions break down common knowledge. A large body of literature in economics examine dynamic coordination problems when there are timing frictions, in the sense that players do not all move at once. Timing frictions in dynamic coordination games play a role that is closely analogous to information frictions in static coordination games.This paper makes explicit the role of higher order beliefs about timing in dynamic coordination games with timing frictions. An event is said to be effectively known if a player knew the event when he last had an option to change his behavior. The lack of effective common knowledge of the time drives results of dynamic coordination games. 相似文献
74.
75.
Mihnsoo Kim 《Global Economic Review》2013,42(3):61-75
China has become a strategically important market for Korean companies. While cooperating with China is obviously important for their success and survival, a more difficult question lies in finding a new and sustainable business model applicable to China. This paper studies the current challenges and strategies of Korean Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the high‐tech market such as the mobile handset and online game industries that are trying to extend their business to China. It focuses on the issue that Korean firms face in order to find a way to survive and integrate with a rising China. By conducting an in‐depth firm level analysis, it examines their successes and failures in terms of what parts of the value chain they specialize in and how they establish a division of labor with China. 相似文献
76.
国有银行的"救助投机"行为促进了国有企业的"预算软约束"和不良贷款的积累。在政府、银行与国有企业之间的长期动态博弈中,由于预算硬约束企业的出现给国有银行提供了改善贷款资产组合的机会,提高了银行在与政府的救助投机博弈中的议价能力,要求政府给予更多的流动性注入,这会产生银行贷款资产中预算硬约束企业贷款占比不断增加的挤入效应。这种挤入效应累积到一定程度,政府的救助将变得非社会最优的,进而政府将停止救助,国有企业的预算约束也随之硬化。 相似文献
77.
高兴佑 《湖南财经高等专科学校学报》2011,27(4):49-52
市场根据垄断程度的不同。可以分为完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断市场四种类型。基于古诺模型,用博弈论方法研究n个厂商市场情形的总产量、价格、总收益和消费者剩余并把它们归纳为统一的公式。从四种市场情形总产量和价格的特点推出其供给曲线的形状,进而比较其社会福利的状况。研究结果表明,随着垄断性的加强,市场的社会福利会越来越劣,完全竞争市场的社会福利最好,垄断竞争市场次之,寡头垄断市场更次,完全垄断市场的社会福利最差。 相似文献
78.
信用效应认识的深化与信用秩序的恢复和增强 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
市场经济从本质上讲是信用经济.在市场经济条件下,信用是最基本的社会经济关系,是整个社会经济得以维系和发展的基础.随着中国经济改革的逐步深入,特别是在加入WTO后,信用的作用逐步显现出来.但是,人们对信用效应的认识还有待深化,尤其是对信用关系紊乱可能带来的负面作用认识得不多,而对信用的积极作用往往习惯于借鉴美欧现成的信用模式.本文从深化对信用效应的认识入手,分析了信用秩序混乱的形成原因,并在简要评价我国信用基本状况的基础上,提出了恢复和增强我国信用秩序的建议. 相似文献
79.
导致医保基金存量减少的原因可以分为两类,一类由客观原因导致,并且难以避免,另一类是人为因素造成的恶意挤占医保基金的行为。针对后一种情况,从经济学角度,首先运用产权理论的观点来分析制度本身的缺陷,再通过建立两个博弈模型来分析当事人投机心理的形成过程,并提出相应解决措施。 相似文献
80.
In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ
Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely.
In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper,
we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives
of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency
in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce
the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other
as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.
相似文献
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