Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Estimating Willingness to Pay for Improved Drinking Water Quality Using Averting Behavior Method with Perception Measure

This paper suggests an application of an averting behaviormethod to reconcile inconsistent public activity with objectiveenvironmental risk. In Korea, an historically polluted watersupply has created citizen resistance to using tap water. Koreansperceive low quality levels for tap water, although objectivelymeasured data show that the pollution levels are lower than theacceptable risk. We hypothesized that the irrational aversion tousing tap water is a consequence of inconsistencies between theobjectively measured and perceived pollution levels. We introducethe perception averting behavior method, in which we add aperception measure unit to the conventional averting behaviormethod. We found that the perception measure provided a validexplanation for citizens' aversion to using tap water in Korea.     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games

Studying a principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it, but the moral hazard is not reducible, shows that, if the principal uses all signals, then no solution exists, i.e. there is no contract that elicits truth-telling and motivates the agent to exert effort. When the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant, a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used, even though they obey the informativeness condition of Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 74–91).     

从当前我国金融道德失范谈加强我国金融道德规范

金融业是一个高风险行业，而其中道德风险又是造成金融风险的重要原因。近年来，金融道德风险已成为我国金融业运行中的突出问题，如何防范和化解金融道德风险，构建金融道德规范，是我国金融业当前面临的重要问题和经济金融界人士关注的一个课题。本文从当前我国金融业的现状中的失范现象提出加强金融道德规范的几项建议，从而有效防范金融道德风险，健全金融道德规范，推动我国金融业健康发展，促进社会和谐。     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

张家界市居民对旅游影响的感知研究

在旅游发展的过程中，旅游目的地居民正逐渐被视为旅游产品的核心，越来越受到人们的重视。以张家界市为例，通过问卷调查和个别访谈的方法，分析了当地居民对旅游经济、社会文化、环境影响的感知，比较了不同人口学特征的居民对旅游影响的感知差异。结果表明，张家界市居民总体上对旅游的正面影响感知较强，对旅游的负面影响感知较弱。最后建议通过建立健全居民参与旅游发展规划的机制来调控居民对旅游影响的感知，以促进旅游地的可持续发展。     

论农业保险经营模式的选择--基于防范信息不对称之上的研究

信息不对称问题是阻碍农业保险经营与发展的重要障碍,在纯商业化形式不适用的情况下,单纯的政策性农业保险也难以化解此矛盾."互助合作 联合共保"农险经营模式可以充分发挥农业保险作为一项不可替代的经济补偿制度的作用.     

浅谈建设项目招投标无标底报价的投标机制选择

无标底的投标机制有利于形成有效的市场竞争环境,能鼓励各建筑承包企业提高管理水平、降低生产成本、提高生产水平.应用信息经济学中的信息不对称理论分析了建设项目招投标过程中的信息不对称,并在此基础上建立了基于委托代理关系的建设项目招投标模型,并探索较合理的投标机制.     

风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。