我国电信业互联互通的接入定价研究

制定合理的接入定价是实现有效互联互通的经济基础。有效的接入定价应达到促进竞争、促进关键设施的有效利用、鼓励网络内部和不同网络之间互联互通的目标。中国目前应选择以长期增量成本为基础的接入定价模式。     

创新网络组织间知识转移影响因素元分析

为梳理创新网络组织间知识转移影响因素并从中识别关键因素,从知识特性、组织主体属性、组织间关系特征和网络结构特征等多维度出发,构建创新网络组织间知识转移影响因素模型,运用元分析方法对国内外2003-2018年80篇实证研究文献进行整合分析。结果显示：创新网络组织间知识转移阻碍因素有知识复杂性、内隐性、组织距离和知识距离,组织距离的阻碍作用最为显著;促进因素有转移意愿、转移能力、接受意愿、吸收能力、关系强度、信任、沟通、网络规模、中心性和结构洞,其中结构洞的促进作用效果最强;地理距离的影响不显著,但地理集聚因素在吸收能力、接受意愿、知识距离、关系强度、信任、网络规模和网络中心性与创新网络知识转移的关系中具有显著调节作用,并且知识距离的双重作用得到解释。     

The endogenous formation of scientific research coalitions

The paper develops a formal model of coalition-building ("network" formation) among research units that seek competitive funding from a supra-regional program, while also drawing support from their respective regional funding agencies. This analysis is motivated by the absence of frameworks of analysis applicable to problems of design of public R&D funding arrangements in the European Union, and in other regional systems were independent programs of "federal and state" support for research co-exists. The model assumes a fixed finite population of research units and an associated distribution of reputed quality, or scientific reputation, which may be modified as a consequence of research results. Non-cooperative games of coalition formation developed by Bloch (1995), and Ray and Vohra (1999), provides a useful single-period framework for this part of the analysis. Collaborations are formed in the expectation of attracting incremental research funding, given the selection criteria of the agency that offers funding for "networks". Invitations to join proposals for networks are initiated and acted upon following a specific ordering procedure. This gives rise to a repeated non-cooperative game of coalition (or collaboration) formation, in which the distribution of payoffs within the collaboration is governed by a fixed rule. Following Keely (2002), this type of game is applied to a multi-period setting in which a distribution of coalitions is tracked, along with the levels of funding received. The latter are determined according to a rule comparing the distribution of reputations within proposed collaborations, and the effects upon the distribution of reputations in the entire population are analysed. Alternative possible external funding rules are evaluated with the help of a numerical example, to determine how their impacts upon collaboration formation, and the resulting evolution of the reputation distribution (as that will be affected by the allocation of funding).     

Network configuration,customer centricity,and performance of open business models: A solution provider perspective

While research has shown a positive impact of open business models on value creation, it has remained silent on the configuration of the corresponding partner networks and their effect on performance. Studying three cases of solution providers which involve external service partners for solution delivery, we find that solution customer centricity – the degree to which the focal firm focuses on solution customers in the joint delivery of solutions – moderates the relationship between partner networks and open business model performance. For open business models with low solution customer centricity, a network configuration characterized by many weak ties to service partners leads to superior performance. Conversely, for open business models with high solution customer centricity, few but strong ties to partners lead to superior performance. Based on these findings, three ideal configurations of networks for open business models are derived: the controlled, the joint, and the supported model.     

Social capital of entrepreneurs and small firm performance: A meta-analysis of contextual and methodological moderators

Despite a surge of studies examining the role of social capital in the entrepreneurial process, no quantitative assessments exist of the empirical evidence to date. To resolve seemingly conflicting results, we conducted a meta-analysis of the link between entrepreneurs' personal networks and small firm performance and identify new moderators affecting this relationship. Analyses of 61 independent samples indicated that the social capital–performance link was positive and significant (r_c = .211). Effect sizes of weak ties were smaller than those of structural holes, while network diversity had the largest positive effect on performance. Results also showed that the social capital–performance link depends on the age of small firms, the industry and institutional contexts in which they operate, and on the specific network or performance measures used. Based on these findings, we develop recommendations for future research on the contingent value of social capital for small firms.     

网络风险、知识和声誉与跨网络边界学习关系实证研究

在分析网络内企业如何通过学习实现转型升级的基础上,建立了网络风险、知识和声誉与跨网络学习的关系模型。基于7大网络内179份调研问卷,运用SPSS 统计工具进一步研究了网络风险、知识和声誉与跨网络边界学习的关系及其对组织绩效的影响。研究发现,网络风险和声誉对跨网络组织边界学习有显著影响,而网络知识对跨网络知识边界学习有显著影响。可以看出,在全球化背景下,开展跨网络学习可以突破来自网络有形和无形边界的“锁定”,并帮助组织跨越各种“壁垒”。跨网络学习也在转型升级的宏观战略和微观行动之间搭起了一座桥梁,从而不断实现由低级网络阶段向高级网络阶段的动态演进。     

分布式创新网络知识协同空间:概念、系统模型及研究展望

在全球化和知识经济高速发展背景下,主导或参与分布式创新网络以实现组织内外创新资源的分布式协同,成为企业的必然选择。“分布式创新网络知识协同空间”这一概念有利于从知识管理视角、信息空间的技术范式和分布式创新协同的效能目标来解释及评价分布式创新网络中的知识活动。在对分布式创新、协同创新、知识协同、信息共享空间等理论进行整合梳理的基础上,提出了分布式创新网络知识协同空间的概念,初步构建并分析了其系统构成及运行机制模型,并对相关研究进行了展望。     

Analysis of a network structure of the foreign currency exchange market

We analyse structure of the world foreign currency exchange (FX) market viewed as a network of interacting currencies. We analyse daily time series of FX data for a set of 63 currencies, including gold, silver and platinum. We group together all the exchange rates with a common base currency and study each group separately. By applying the methods of filtered correlation matrix we identify clusters of closely related currencies. The clusters are formed typically according to the economical and geographical factors. We also study topology of weighted minimal spanning trees for different network representations (i.e., for different base currencies) and find that in a majority of representations the network has a hierarchical scale-free structure. In addition, we analyse the temporal evolution of the network and detect that its structure is not stable over time. A medium-term trend can be identified which affects the USD node by decreasing its centrality. Our analysis shows also an increasing role of euro in the world’s currency market.     

Global networks of clusters of innovation: Accelerating the innovation process

This article presents a framework for understanding new patterns of innovation and commercialization that are most easily observed in Clusters of Innovation (COI) and in the global connections established among them. We define COI as environments that favor the creation and development of high potential entrepreneurial ventures. COI are characterized by heightened mobility of resources (principally people, capital, and information—including intellectual property); increased velocity of business development; and a culture of mobility that leads to an affinity for collaboration, development of durable relationships, and the formation of Networks of Clusters of Innovation (NCOI). These networks are distinct sets of relationships. When the connections progress to the point of mutual dependence and business integration among participating enterprises, such covalent bonds form tightly interrelated business communities, or Super-Clusters of Innovation (Super-COI). In this article, we analyze the characteristics of COI and the nature of the relationships that arise between them to form NCOI and Super-COI. Further, we present an integrated model to better understand the global innovation system.     

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suffer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how parties may exploit this effect to their interest. We characterize the strong perfect equilibria of the game and show that, in equilibrium, the social network determines which party wins the election. We also show that to dispose of the citizens better connected in the network with the other faction is not a guarantee to win the election.