Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views

Do incentives differ between large and small organizations? Results from a representative survey of compensation managers are used to shed light on the issues. I find that (i) small establishments rely less on pecuniary incentives, and have a significantly more hostile attitude towards incentive schemes based on competition and relative rewards; (ii) large units are more vulnerable to mechanisms of efficiency wages, effects that remain even after controlling for differences in monitoring ability; (iii) large units are more prone to indicate that negative reciprocity is important, and that their employees care about relative pay. I argue that these findings fit with behavioral stories of incentives and motivation, in particular those stressing group interaction effects, inequity aversion and gift exchange.     

THE SQUARED ORNSTEIN-UHLENBECK MARKET

We study a complete market containing J assets, each asset contributing to the production of a single commodity at a rate that is a solution to the squared Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross) SDE. The assets are owned by K agents with CRRA utility functions, who follow feasible consumption/investment regimes so as to maximize their expected time-additive utility from consumption. We compute the equilibrium for this economy and determine the state-price density process from market clearing. Reducing to a single (representative) agent, and exploiting the relation between the squared-OU and squared-Bessel SDEs, we obtain closed-form expressions for the values of bonds, assets, and options on the total asset value. Typical model parameters are estimated by fitting bond price data, and we use these parameters to price the assets and options numerically. Implications for the total asset price itself as a diffusion are discussed. We also estimate implied volatility surfaces for options and bond yields.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

跨国公司中的内部贸易问题探讨

随着跨国公司不断发展,其内部化贸易作用日显重要。本文从内部化贸易的理论依据开始,着重分析了内部化贸易在跨国公司资本运作中的作用以及其相应的负面影响,为我国在处理有关跨国公司内部化问题时提供了参考依据。     

标准化在油藏监测工作中的作用

以油藏监测工作中的油藏压力监测为例，介绍了标准化工作在压力资料录取及解释分析中的作用。并用实例说明了标准化作业在油田开发方案的制定及油藏压力监测中的应用。     

基于混合激励机制的两层供应链产品开发合作博弈分析

针对供应商与制造商在产品开发合作中潜在的风险,建立了动态合作博弈模型,通过对正负激励策略的比较分析,得出两种激励策略按照一定结构混合运用能有效地发挥负激励降低合作风险、正激励增加合作收益的作用的结论。     

经济发展的税收效应定量分析

采取面板数据模型分析了经济发展的税收效应,发现经济发展的不同层面对税收的影响不同,表明政府在进行税收改革时要充分考虑经济发展的反作用。结果显示,生活水平提高总体上会降低税率、流转税比重和其他税比重以及提高所得税比重,实际经济增长率增加会提高税率和其他税比重、降低流转税比重和所得税比重,城乡收入差距扩大会降低税率、所得税比重和其他税比重以及提高流转税比重。     

Asymmetric volatility in the foreign exchange markets

We examine the presence or absence of asymmetric volatility in the exchange rates of Australian dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), British pound (GBP) and Japanese yen (JPY), all against US dollar. Our investigation is based on a variant of the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility model, using daily realized variance and return series from 1996 to 2004. We find that a depreciation against USD leads to significantly greater volatility than an appreciation for AUD and GBP, whereas the opposite is true for JPY. Relative to volatility on days following a positive one-standard-deviation return, volatility on days following a negative one-standard-deviation return is higher by 6.6% for AUD, 6.1% for GBP, and 21.2% for JPY. The realized volatility of EUR appears to be symmetric. These results are robust to the removal of jump component from realized volatility and the sub-samplings defined by structural-changes. The asymmetry in AUD, GBP and JPY appears to be embedded in the continuous component of realized volatility rather than the jump component.     

基于引力模型的中美农产品贸易边境效应研究

针对中美两国在农产品贸易上的新变化,应用引力模型的派生模型——边境效应引力模型对中美两国农产品贸易的流量和流向进行理论和实证研究。首先介绍了边境效应引力模型基本模型的推导过程,并引入了调整模型。然后采用1987至2005年其中5年的截面数据进行计算,结果发现:中美农产品贸易的边境效应显著存在,且呈逐年下降趋势;两国之间的农产品贸易边境效应存在流向和区域上的差异;距离的平方并不影响模型的可靠性。     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.