“内部治理”与“外部监管”：国有股东在民营企业并购中的双重身份

以混合所有制改革为背景,采用2005—2018年沪深A股民营上市公司数据,考察民营企业中引入国有股东参与治理对其并购过程中代理成本的影响,并分析二者之间的作用机制。结果显示：国有股东能够以外部大股东和政府监管者的双重身份,通过加强内部治理和外部监管的作用显著降低民营企业并购过程中的代理成本,其中,委派董事可以缓解第一类代理问题;股权制衡可以缓解第二类代理问题。这种作用关系在地区法制化水平、行业竞争程度和内部控制质量低的情况下更为显著。     

工程成本管理中BIM技术的应用

合理控制工程成本,对于建筑施工企业意义重大。论文从BIM技术在建筑工程施工成本全过程管理中应用的实际效果入手,对BIM技术的信息完备性、信息关联性、信息一致性、可视化、模拟性以及可出图性等应用优势进行分析,结合BIM技术在具体施工阶段的应用案例,探讨在科学控制施工成本、提升施工企业经济效益方面如何运用BIM技术以发挥其积极作用,为工程成本管理工作提供借鉴和参考。     

关于成本控制在企业管理中的运用分析

在我国全面建设社会主义过程中,企业的作用是无可替代的。随着经济的迅速发展,企业的压力越来越大,因此,对企业进行成本控制,提高经济效益是非常有必要的。在企业管理过程中运用科学的成本核算以及管理策略,并意识到成本管理对企业发展的重要作用,以把握好企业的资金流动变化,为企业未来发展作好铺垫工作。论文通过分析成本控制的重要性,探究相应的运用方式。     

建筑施工成本管理的造价预结算审核

在建筑工程施工的过程中,施工成本管理工作是十分重要的。其中预结算审计和成本控制是影响成本管理工作的重要因素。论文根据一些有关的材料,对工程建设中造价预结算的基本含义以及对企业的影响进行分析,为未来建筑企业发展以及有关的专业研究人员提供参考。     

价值链成本管理模式在高新技术制造业的应用

随着高新技术制造业的不断发展,作为技术密集型的高新技术制造业对于成本管理的标准越来越高。企业竞争不只是某个环节的竞争,确保每个环节的成本控制、提高整个价值链的综合竞争力才能使企业拥有更强的竞争力。基于价值链的成本管理模式成为企业提高市场竞争力的一大利器。论文分析了价值链成本管理模式的理论和特征,以及现今理论的应用和结果,提出使用新型成本管理模式所要面临的困难与挑战,并对此提出部分建议。     

浅析企业战略成本管理存在的问题及对策

基于新冠肺炎疫情对企业的影响,做好战略成本管理工作对提高企业适应当前市场环境的能力、规避财务风险具有重要意义。论文结合工作实践经验,以战略成本管理的概述作为切入点,剖析企业战略成本管理的现状及存在的问题,提出解决战略成本管理问题的具体对策。     

An Econometric Estimation of Industrial Water Demand in France

This study investigates the structure of industrial water demand byestimating the derived demand for water on a sample of industrialestablishments located in the south-west of France. Productiontechnologies are represented by short-term variable cost functions andapproximated by a translog form. Industrial water use is modeled ashaving three components: the quantity of water bought to a waterutility, the quantity of autonomous water and the quantity of watertreated prior to use. We include in this framework water effluents,which are considered as a by-product of the production process, emittedby firms. Each of the three water components is treated as a separateinput and all are estimated as a system of simultaneous equations. Themodel is estimated on a sample of 51 industrial plants in the Girondedistrict observed from 1994 to 1996 using Seemingly Unrelated Regression(SUR) and Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). Results ofestimations show that industrial firms are sensitive to water priceinputs. Network water elasticity is estimated at –0.29. It variesfrom –0.10 to –0.79 according to the type of industryconsidered. Autonomous water price elasticity is not significant.Elasticity for treated water is evaluated at –1.42 at themean-sample and varies from –0.90 to –2.21 according to theindustry considered.     

征税成本领先性假设与中国税务组织结构优化——兼析中国国税、地税机构是否存在合并趋势

本文从征税成本领先性假设出发探讨了中国税务组织结构的优化问题 ,并分析了社会各界广泛关注的中国国税、地税机构是否存在合并趋势的问题。本文在对中国现行税务组织机构运行绩效考察的基础上 ,发现中国征税成本曲线呈抛物线状 ,表明中国征税成本正呈递减趋势。以此为出发点 ,本文详细论证了中国国税、地税机构不存在合并的趋势 ,相反 ,分设更为彻底却是今后的发展趋势 ,得出了与一般看法不同的结论 ,并对优化中国税务组织结构提出了政策建议     

Intertemporal Equity and Efficient Allocation of Resources

Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D90, O41.     

Free Entry under Uncertainty

When focusing on firm’s risk-aversion in industry equilibrium, the number of firms may be either larger or smaller when comparing market equilibrium with and without price uncertainty. In this paper, we introduce risk-averse firms under cost uncertainty in a model of spatial differentiation and show that the impact of uncertainty will increase the number of firms in an industry. With increased uncertainty, the risk premium of the marginal buyer increases by more than the risk premium of the average buyer, so that the price increases by more than the risk premium. When turning to the free entry game, we find that the market generates too many firms.